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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL -LAW - CORRECTIONS - INTRASTATE PRISON
TRANSFERS HELD NOT TO VIOLATE DUE PROCESS WHEN STATE LAW
DOES NOT CONDITION SUCH TRANSFERS ON PROOF OF SERIOUS
MISCONDUCT.
Meachum v. Fano (U.S. 1976)
During a two-and-one-half-month period in 1974, a series of nine fires
occurred at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Norfolk (Nor-
folk), a medium security institution.' The authorities at Norfolk, having
received information from prison informants that the respondents, six
inmates, were significantly involved in the planning and execution of one
or more of the fires, instituted proceedings 2 before the Norfolk Classifica-
tion Board to decide whether the inmates should be transferred to the
Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Walpole (Walpole), a maxi-
1. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 216 (1976).
2. Id. All six respondents, inmates Fano, DeBrosky, Dussault, Hathaway,
MacPhearson, and Royce, were notified of the hearing and informed that the authori-
ties had information indicating that they were involved in criminal conduct. The
following notice was given to respondents Fano, DeBrosky, and Dussault:
The department has received information through a reliable source that you
were in possession of instruments that might be used as weapons and/or ammuni-
tion and that you had joined in plans to use these contraband items.
These items and plans occurred during the period of serious unrest at MCI,
Norfolk which included many fires that posed a significant threat to lives of
persons at MCI, Norfolk as well as serious property damage.
Id. at 217 n.1
Respondents Hathaway and MacPhearson received a communication which
stated :
The department has received information through reliable sources that you
were significantly involved in the planning and execution of one or more of the seri-
ous fires occurring within MCI, Norfolk in the past few weeks. These fires caused
considerable property damage and posed a very real threat to personal safety.
Id. at 217 n.1.
The following notice was given to respondent Royce:
The department has received information through a reliable source that you
were involved in the trafficking of contraband in MCI, Norfolk (narcotics, bar-
biturates and/or amphetamines).
This occurred during a period of serious unrest at MCI, Norfolk which in-
cluded many fires that posed a significant threat to the lives of persons at MCI,
Norfolk as well as serious property damage.
Id. at 217 n.1. Prior to the hearing, the respondents were removed from the general
prison population and placed in an administrative detention area used to process new
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mum security prison with living conditions substantially less favorable
than those at Norfolk.8 After reviewing the classification board's recom-
mendations, 4 petitioners Dawber, the Acting Deputy for Classification
and Treatment, and Hall, the State Commissioner of Corrections, trans-
ferred five of the inmates to Walpole5 and the other inmate to the Massa-
3. Norfolk, a medium security, walled institution with an average population of
700 inmates, accommodates prisoners who are thought to have a greater potential to be
rehabilitated. Designed to be more spacious and less "prison-like," it contains dormitory
units rather than cell blocks. The prisoners work in shops where clothing, fabricated
metal items, concrete novelties, park benches, mattresses, and shoes are manufactured.
Additionally, there is a furniture upholstering and woodworking shop. The prison
also provides apprentice training programs in barbering, welding, drafting, and auto
repairing. For inmates who are within six months of being discharged from Norfolk
there exists a prerelease program which enable them to develop more realistic voca-
tional planning. The program includes counseling at the prison and, for selected
inmates, two to six weeks in a halfway house in Boston, with personnel available from
the Division of Employment Security to facilitate vocational reentry into the com-
munity. Inmates at Norfolk have the opportunity to work both at the Wrentham
State School, which provides care for the retarded, and at the Foxboro State Hospital.
A training program in the theatrical arts is also available. Norfolk offers opportuni-
ties for education through classroom instruction, leading to a high school equivalency
certificate. The prison's library is equipped with over 12,000 volumes. The institution
has a 75-bed hospital, accredited by the American Medical Association, which provides
medical and surgical services. E. PowERs, THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE ADMINIS-
TRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN MASSACHUSETTS 210-12 (6th ed. 1973).
Walpole, a maximum security prison, has an average population of 575 in-
mates, most of whom have been committed there directly by the courts. The prison
provides a limited number of vocational training programs and is equipped with only
a few modern classrooms. Walpole contains a "Segregation Unit" - a separate
building within the walls that has the capacity to accommodate 60 men. While the
Segregation Unit has furnished cells and limited recreational facilities, its inhabitants
have no access to the rest of the institution. Inmates in the general prison population
whose presence is deemed detrimental to the program of the institution may be trans-
ferred to the unit by the commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Corrections
for an indefinite period. Walpole also contains an isolation unit, used for the enforce-
ment of discipline. This unit is provided with light, ventilation, adequate sanitary
facilities and some furniture. The prison superintendent may confine an inmate to the
unit for no longer than 15 days for any one offense. Medical facilities at Walpole
consist of a 15-bed infirmary, a doctor's office, two treatment rooms, a dental room
with two chairs, an x-ray room, a pharmacy, and two specialty rooms. In special
cases an inmate may be transferred to the prison hospital at Norfolk for treatment.
Id. at 212-14.
4. The classification board recommended that Fano, Dussault, and MacPhearson
be transferred to Walpole; that DeBrosky and Hathaway be transferred to the Massa-
chusetts Correctional Center at Bridgewater (Bridgewater), which had both maximum
and medium security facilities; and that Royce be placed in administrative segregation
for 30 days. 427 U.S. at 218.
5. Id. at 221. DeBrosky's attorney received the following explanation of the
commissioner's reasons for not adhering to the board's recommendation (see note 4
supra) with respect to his client:
As you are aware, the recommendation of the Board was for placement at
MCI-Bridgewater. However, after a thorough review of the facts, with con-
siderable concern being given to the intelligence information that connected Mr.
DeBrosky with involvement with a weapon, the Commissioner has decided to
place Mr. DeBrosky at MCI-Walpole. The intelligence information referred to
1976-1977]
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chusetts Correctional Center at Bridgewater, which has both maximum
and medium security facilities. 6
Alleging that the factfinding hearings conducted before their transfers
were constitutionally inadequate and thus resulted in a deprivation of
liberty without due process of law,7 the respondents filed suit under sec-
tion 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 18718 in the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts against Meachum, the prison
superintendent, Dawber, and Hall.9 The district court ordered the inmates
returned to the general prison population at Norfolk until they were
afforded proper notice and an adequate hearing.10 On appeal, the order
was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
which concluded that a transfer from a medium security prison to a maxi-
mum security prison was "serious enough to trigger the application of
above was judged to be reliable. Your request that the subject be placed back
into the population at MCI-Norfolk is being denied.
427 U.S. at 221 n.3. Respondent Royce, whose transfer was also not in accord with
the board's decision, was informed of the following:
Upon careful examination of all related materials and information, I have
reached the following decision:
Placement: MCI, Walpole.
Reasons: I disagree with the recommendation of the Board and I am assign-
ing you to MCI, Walpole because I feel that you have demonstrated that you are
unwilling and/or unable to accept the responsibility that is commensurate with
assignment to MCI, Norfolk, a medium security facility. Your actions of Novem-
ber 1, 1974 whereby you destroyed state property and displayed disrespect to a
Correctional Officer have played a part in this decision.
Id.
6. Respondent Hathaway was the only inmate transferred to Bridgewater. See
note 4 supra.
7. 427 U.S. at 222. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
prohibits the states from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law ...... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The respondents averred
that they were not afforded the minimum protection of due process because the evi-
dence concerning the alleged offenses, which apparently consisted of superintendent
Meachum's disclosure of the information he received from the informants, was heard
in a closed session out of the presence of the inmates and their counsel. Fano v.
Meachum, 520 F.2d 374, 376 (1st Cir. 1975). The respondents additionally alleged
that this information was not revealed to them or their counsel and that they were not
informed of the dates and locations of the alleged offenses. Id.
8. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
9. 427 U.S. at 222. The respondents sought declaratory relief, damages, and
an injunction setting aside the ordered transfers. Id.
10. Fano v. Meachum, 387 F. Supp. 664, 668-69 (D. Mass. 1975). The district
court stated: "It is absolutely basic to any concept of due process that a person
charged be given sufficient information concerning the charge against him so that he
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the due process protections."'" The United States Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that since state law did not condition the authority to
transfer upon the occurrence of specific acts of misconduct or other events,
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment did not require prison
officials to conduct factfinding hearings in connection with the transfers
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
As a general proposition, procedural due process, by embodying the
notion of fundamental fairness, 12 mandates that the state provide notice
and a hearing before taking action to deprive a person of "life, liberty, or
property."' 3 Although, traditionally, the protection afforded by the due
process clause extended only to "rights" and not to "privileges,"' 14 recent
Supreme Court cases have abandoned the right-privilege distinction. 15
11. 520 F.2d at 377-78. Some courts have separated administrative transfers from
disciplinary transfers in their decisions. See Aikens v. Lash, 514 F.2d 55 (7th Cir.
1975), vacated, 425 U.S. 947 (1976); Haymes v. Montanye, 505 F.2d 977 (2d Cir.
1974), rev'd, 427 U.S. 236 (1976) ;Bryant v. Hardy, 488 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1973).
The First Circuit, however, chose not to distinguish them:
We attach no significance for present purposes to the fact that these proceed-
ings were for "classification" rather than "discipline." Defendants assert that
"there are in the instant case as many administrative overtones as disciplinary
ones," but we have already indicated that in our view the motive of prison officials,
as such, is not properly a part of the due process calculus. . . . Whether the
transfer is thought of as punishment or as a way of preserving institutional order,
the effects on the inmate are the same and the appropriateness of the action
depends upon the accuracy of the official allegation of misconduct.
520 F.2d at 376 n.2 (citation omitted).
12. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 181 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615-16 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) ; Pointer
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408-09 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); Hannah v. Larche,
363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960) ; Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 170 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Rogge, An Overview of Administra-
tive Due Process, 19 VILL. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1974).
13. For example, in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1971), the Court stated:
"For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been
clear: 'Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order
that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.'" Id. at 80, quoting Baldwin
v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863). See also Dixon v. Alabama State Bd.
of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158-59 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
14. Under the right-privilege doctrine, various types of governmental benefits
were treated as gratuities which the government could provide or take away without
a hearing. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950)
(exclusion of aliens) ; Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an
equally divided court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (government employment). See generally
Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law,
81 HARv. L. Rav. 1439, 1439-42 (1968).
15. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Court stated that "'this
Court now has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a
governmental benefit is characterized as a "right" or as a "privilege."' Id. at 481,
quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971) ; see, e.g., Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (nonrenewal of state college teacher's contract) ; Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971) (denial of welfare benefits to aliens); Bell
v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (suspension of driver's operating license);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (termination of welfare payments);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969) (denial of welfare benefits to
residents who have not resided within the state for at least one year).
1976-1977]
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Instead, the Court has focused upon the extent to which a person has
suffered a "grievous loss" in determining whether due process safeguards
are applicable.' 6 As elucidated by recent cases, this analysis has centered
not merely upon the "weight" of the individual's interest, but also upon
whether the "nature" of the interest is one within the contemplation of
the "liberty or property" language of the fourteenth amendment.' 7
Two recent Supreme Court cases involving the termination of em-
ployment of state college teachers have provided some guidance as to
what liberty or property interests are constitutionally protected. In Board
of Regents v. Roth,18 the Court held that a professor, hired under a one-
year contract with no provision for renewal by a state university which
had a formal tenure system, had no constitutionally protected interest in
being rehired and therefore was not entitled to a hearing prior to the non-
renewal of his contract. The Roth Court stated that while the meaning
of liberty must be broad enough to protect a person's good name, reputa-
tion, honor, and integrity, there was no suggestion that those interests
were at stake in that case. 19 The Court stressed that a claim for due
process protections must be founded upon some objective source and that
an individual's expectations alone are insufficient.20 Perry v. Sindermann,21
16. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Supreme Court held that the
state could not terminate welfare payments without first providing the individual with
the procedural protections of "timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a
proposed termination, and an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any
adverse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and evidence orally." Id. at
267-68. The Court stated: "The extent to which procedural due process must be
afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be 'condemned to
suffer grievous loss.'" 397 U.S. at 262-63, quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
17. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972), citing Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
In deciding the form of the procedures required before a deprivation of a
protected interest takes place, the Court balances the individual's interest in avoiding
the loss against the state's interest in a summary adjudication. See Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972) ; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ;
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970). In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971), the Court stated: "The formality and procedural requisites for the hearing
can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of
the subsequent proceedings." Id. at 378.
18. 408 U.S. 564 (1972) ; see Rogge, An Overview of Administrative Due Process,
19 VILL. L. REV. 1, 38-40 (1974) ; Comment, Due Process Rights of Nontenured
Teachers - Nonrenewal of Contract, 77 DICK. L. REV. 94, 96 (1972) ; Note, Con-
stitutional Safeguards for Teachers Employed by Public Educational System upon
Dismissal or Disciplinary Actions, 2 CAP. L. REV. 164 (1973) ; Note, Implied Contract
Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 347 (1974); 41 FORDHAm L. REv.
684 (1973).
19. 408 U.S. at 572-73.
20. Id. at 577, see Note, Procedural Due Process in Government-Subsidized
Housing, 86 HARV. L. REV. 880, 890 (1972).
21. 408 U.S. 593 (1972); see Rogge, An Overview of Administrative Due
Process, 19 VILL. L. REV. 1, 38-40 (1974) ; Comment, Due Process Rights of Non-
tenured Teachers - Nonrenewal of Contract, 77 DICK. L. REV. 94, 99 (1972) ; Note,
Constitutional Safeguards for Teachers Employed by Public Educational Systems
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however, made it clear that the conferral of a protected right need not be
explicit. In that case, a professor employed under a series of ten one-year
contracts by a state university which had no formal tenure system was
given the opportunity to prove22 that there existed a de facto tenure
system officially created and fostered by the university by rules and under-
standings, under the terms of which the professor had tenure. 23 The
Court stated that if the professor could prove the existence of such a
system, he would have a property interest protected by due process safe-
guards.2 4
Procedural due process protections have only recently been extended
into the corrections field.2 5 The two principal reasons for the delay were
the Court's adherence to the "hands-off doctrine," 26 under which jurisdic-
tion over prisoners' rights cases was denied in deference to prison ad-
ministrators' discretion, 27 and the difficulty in delineating the scope of
the rights and liberties to be accorded to prisoners.2 8 The effect of the
"hands-off doctrine" has been diminished as the result of several recent
Supreme Court decisions giving prisoners access to judicial review.2 9
Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REv. 335, 347 (1974) ; 4 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 203 (1972).
22. The district court had granted summary judgment for the members of the
board of regents and the president of the college because the plaintiff's teaching con-
tract had expired and the college had not adopted a tenure system. 408 U.S. at 596.
23. Id. at 602-03.
24. Id. at 603.
25. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (due process in prison
disciplinary hearings); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (procedural
protections must accompany the decision to censor or withhold prisoners' mail);
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 478 (1973) (due process in probation revocation hear-
ings); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (due process in parole revocation
hearings).
26. This theory was based upon two policies: 1) the strong government interest
in orderly incarceration; and 2) the view that interference by the courts, which have
neither the authority nor the expertise to act as prison review panels, would impair
the ability of prison officials to carry out the varied and complex objectives of a penal
system. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974); SOUTH CAROLINA
DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, THE EMERGING RIGHTS OF THE CONFINED 28 (1972); Note,
The Evolving Right of Due Process at Prison Disciplinary Hearings, 42 FORDHAm L.
REV. 878, 880 (1974) ; Note, Procedural Due Process in the Involuntary Institutional
Transfer of Prisoners, 60 VA. L. REV. 333, 335 (1974).
27. See, e.g., Siegel v. Ragen, 88 F. Supp. 996, 999 (N.D. Ill. 1949), aff'd, 180
F.2d 785 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950).
28. See Note, The Evolving Right of Due Process at Prison Disciplinary Hear-
ings, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 878, 881 (1974).
29. For example, in Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam), the
Court stated:
Federal Courts sit not to supervise prisons but to enforce the constitutional rights
of all "persons," including prisoners. We are not unmindful that prison officials
must be accorded latitude in the administration of prison affairs, and that prisoners
necessarily are subject to appropriate rules and regulations. But persons in
prison, like other individuals, have the right to petition the Government for re-
dress of grievances which, of course, includes "access of prisoners to the courts
for the purpose of presenting their complaints."
Id. at 321, quoting Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969).
1976-1977]
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At the same time, the Court has recognized that inmates do indeed possess
certain rights.80
In Morrissey v. Brewer,8 ' the Supreme Court, not adhering to the
restraints of the "hands-off doctrine" and recognizing the limited liberty
interest of a parolee, 2 held that a parolee's interest in remaining out of
prison is protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
and that, prior to its termination by the state, an informal factfinding hear-
ing is required to determine whether a parole violation has in fact oc-
curred.33 The safeguards enunciated in Morrissey were subsequently ex-
tended to probationers in Gagnon v. Scarpelli.3
4
While Morrissey and Gagnon had a significant impact in the cor-
rections field, 5 it was the Court's decision in Wolff v. McDonnell6 that
30. See notes 31-39 and accompanying text infra. For cases granting specific
rights to inmates, see note 43 infra.
31. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). Morrissey was convicted of false drawing or uttering
of checks in 1967 and was sentenced to not more than seven years confinement. Id.
at 472. He was paroled from the Iowa State Penitentiary in 1968, but was arrested
seven months later for violating the terms of his parole and incarcerated in the county
jail. Id. The Iowa Board of Parole then revoked his parole and he was returned to
the state penitentiary. Id. at 472-73.
32. Id. at 482. The Morrissey Court stated: "We see, therefore, that the liberty
of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified
liberty .... " Id.
33. Id. The Morrissey Court recognized that revocation of parole is not part of a
criminal prosecution and that not all the rights due a defendant at trial apply to parole
revocations. Id. at 480. The Court held that the minimum requirements of due process
in revoking parole include: 1) written notice of the claimed parole violations; 2) dis-
closure to the parolee of the evidence against him; 3) an opportunity to be heard in
person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; 4) the right to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses, unless there is good cause for not allowing
confrontation; 5) a neutral and detached hearing body, such as a traditional parole
board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and 6) a written
statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for revoking
parole. Id. at 489.
34. 411 U.S. 778 (1973). Scarpelli pleaded guilty to a charge of armed robbery
in July 1965. Id. at 779. He was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment, but the judge
suspended the sentence and placed him on probation for seven years. Id. On August
6, Scarpelli was arrested by police on burglary charges. Id. at 779-80. On September
1, the Wisconsin Department of Public Welfare revoked Scarpelli's probation without
a hearing. Id. at 780. In affirming in part the order of the Seventh Circuit, which
concluded that a revocation of probation without a hearing was a denial of due process,
the United States Supreme Court stated: "Probation revocation, like parole revoca-
tion, is not a stage of a criminal prosecution, but does result in a loss of liberty.
Accordingly, we hold that a probationer, like a parolee, is entitled to a preliminary and
a final revocation hearing, under the conditions specified in Morrissey v. Brewer."
Id. at 782.
35. See, e.g., Tobriner & Cohen, How Much Process is "Due"? Parolees and
Prisoners, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 801 (1974) ; Note, Implications of Morrissey v. Brewer
for Prison Disciplinary Hearings in Indiana, 49 IND. L.J. 306 (1973-74) ; Note, An
Endorsement of Due Process Reform in Parole Revocation: Morrissey v. Brewer,
6 Loy. L.A.L. Rzv. 157 (1973); 11 DUQ. L. REv. 693 (1973).
36. 418 U.S. 539 (1974). McDonnell filed a complaint on behalf of himself and
other inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex alleging that the
prison's disciplinary procedures violated due process, that the inmate legal assistance
program was constitutionally inadequate, and that the prison's regulations regarding
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extended due process protections to the regulation of prison disciplinary
practices. Wolff, which held that a prisoner is entitled to procedural pro-
tections before his "good time" credits are revoked or before he is con-
fined in a disciplinary cell, 7 generated much litigation in the lower courts
concerning what other types of prison discipline were subject to proce-
dural protectionsA In particular, the lower courts have been divided in
deciding whether due process extends to involuntary prison transfers.Y9
It was against this background of judicial dispute that the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Constitution requires
prison officials to conduct a factfinding hearing prior to a transfer when
state law does not condition the authority to transfer upon the occurrence
of acts of misconduct or other specified events.4 0 In examining the scope
of protection afforded by the due process clause, the Meachum Court
observed, in an opinion by Justice White, that the state may not initially
deprive an individual of his liberty without first complying fully with cer-
tain procedural standards; after a conviction has been validly obtained,
however, the state has met its constitutional obligations and can deprive
the individual of his liberty through confinement and by subjecting him
to the rules of its prison system "so long as the conditions of confinement
do not otherwise violate the Constitution." 41 Noting that the Constitu-
483 F.2d 1059, 1061 (8th Cir. 1973). With regard to the due process claim, McDonnell
stated that on the occasions that he appeared before the disciplinary board, he received
no notice of any charges against him until he had actually appeared. McDonnell v.
Wolff, 342 F. Supp. 616, 626 (D. Neb. 1972).
37. 418 U.S. at 571. The Court noted that although the impact upon the inmate
of a revocation of "good time" - a system by which the inmate's parole date is deter-
mined - is not as immediate as the revocation of parole upon the parolee, it is still a
matter of serious importance. Id. at 561. The Court thus concluded that while not all
of the procedures specified in Morrissey and Gagnon (see note 31 supra) must accom-
pany the deprivation of good time, advance written notice of the claimed violation and
a written statement of the fact findings as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons
for the disciplinary action taken are required. 418 U.S. at 564.
38. The Wolff decision left unanswered the question whether procedural protec-
tions are needed for institutional transfers and detainers, whether or not made for
disciplinary reasons, for administrative segregations, and for disciplinary action which
is less severe than a revocation of good time credits or solitary confinement. See W.
TOAL, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CORRECTIONAL CASE LAW 43, 45-47, 79-80, 85-89
(1975).
39. The Courts of Appeals for the Third and the Ninth Circuits have held that
transfers of prisoners do not call for due process hearings. See, e.g., Gray v. Creamer,
465 F.2d 179, 187 (3d Cir. 1972) ; Hillen v. Director, 455 F.2d 510 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972). The Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, how-
ever, have held that minimum due process procedures must precede disciplinary
transfers. See, e.g., Aikens v. Lash, 514 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1975), vacated, 425 U.S.
947 (1976); Stone v. Egeler, 506 F.2d 287 (6th Cir. 1974); Haymes v. Montanye,
505 F.2d 977 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd 427 U.S. 236 (1976) Bryant v. Hardy, 488 F.2d
72 (4th Cir. 1973). The First Circuit, in holding that every disadvantageous transfer
must be accompanied by appropriate hearings, would apparently extend protection to
administrative, as well as disciplinary transfers. See Fano v. Meachum, 520 F.2d
374 (1st Cir. 1975), rev'd 427 U.S. at 215 (1976); Gomes v. Traviasono, 510 F.2d
537, 541 (1st Cir. 1974).
40. 427 U.S. at 216.
41. Id. at 224
1976-19771
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tion does not require the states to establish different types of prisons or
guarantee to those convicted that they will be placed in a particular prison,
the Court stressed that even though the living conditions of different
prisons may vary substantially, the initial decision to assign a convicted
individual to a particular institution is not subject to audit under the due
process clause.4 2
The Court pointed out that while previous cases had held that a
convicted prisoner does not forfeit all of his constitutional rights after a valid
conviction, 43 none of those cases had gone so far as to hold that any sub-
stantial deprivation imposed by prison authorities triggers the procedural
protections of the due process clause.44 Such a holding, the Court rea-
soned, would compel the federal courts to review discretionary decisions
that have traditionally been left to prison administrators.4 5  Recognizing
that transfer decisions are often made for reasons other than discipline, 4 6
the Court was unwilling to require a hearing merely because "the transfer
would place the prisoner in substantially more burdensome conditions
that [sic] he had been experiencing." 47
In reaching the instant decision, the Court distinguished Wolff on
its facts, noting that in that case a state prisoner was entitled to certain
due process protections before being deprived of good time credits because
the state itself, rather than the Constitution, had " 'not only provided a
statutory right to good time, but also [specified] that it [was] to be for-
feited only for serious misbehavior.' "48 In Meachum, by contrast, Massa-
chusetts law49 did not specifically guarantee a right to a hearing before
42. Id.
43. Id., citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (due process). See also
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (freedom of religion) ; Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519 (1972) (due process); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971) (due
process) ; Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (access to courts) ; Johnson v.
Avery, 393 U.S. 489 (1969) (access to courts) ; Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333
(1968) (freedom from race discrimination) ; Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1968)
(freedom of religion) ; Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941) (access to courts).
44. 427 U.S. at 225. Earlier in its opinion, the Court recognized the proposition
that not every change in the conditions of confinement resulting in the prisoner being
placed in substantially less favorable surroundings would require procedural safe-
guards. Id. at 224, citing Roth, the Court noted that "the determining factor is the
nature of the interest involved rather than the weight." Id., citing Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972).
45. 427 U.S. at 225.
46. Id. The Court stated that other reasons for transfers "often involve no more
than informed predictions as to what would . . . best serve institutional security or the
safety and welfare of the inmate." Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. 'at 226, quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974). For a
discussion of Wolff, see notes 36-38 and accompanying text supra.
49. At the time the transfers in the instant case occurred, Massachusetts law
authorized the following scheme for classifying prisoners:
There shall be established by the commissioner . . . a reception center for all
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transfer.5 0 Turning to the question of Whether the Constitution itself
guaranteed such a right,51 the Court held that since the state invested
prison officials with the discretion to transfer inmates for any reason or
for no reason at all, "[w]hatever expectation the prisoner may have in
remaining at a particular prison so long as he behaves himself . . . is too
ephemeral and insubstantial to trigger due process protections. '5 2
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall, disagreed with the majority's conception of "liberty" as
having its exclusive source either in the Constitution or in state law.5
According to the dissent, "liberty," as "one of the cardinal unalienable
rights," should not be limited to "the particular rights or privileges con-
ferred by specific laws or regulations."5 4
Specifically addressing the problem of defining the liberty interest of
inmates, the dissent interpreted Morrissey as support for the proposition
that a prisoner possesses "[a] residuum of constitutionally protected
tution of the commonwealth . . . shall be delivered by the sheriff or other officer
authorized to execute sentence to said center for the purpose of proper classifica-
tion of the prisoner....The deputy commissioner for classification and treatment, under the general
supervision of the commissioner, shall direct the professional staff assigned to
said reception center and shall be responsible for grading and classifying all
prisoners sentenced to any of the correctional institutions of the commonwealth,
and shall in addition have general charge of the reception center.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 127, § 20 (West 1974). In addition, state law regulated
the transfer of inmates to and from correctional institutions as follows:
The commissioner may transfer any sentenced prisoner from one correc-
tional institution of the commonwealth to another, and with the approval of the
sheriff of the county from any such institution except a prisoner serving a life
sentence to any jail or house of correction, or a sentenced prisoner from any jail
or house of correction to any such institution except the state prison, or from anyjail or house of correction to any other jail or house of correction. Prisoners so
removed shall be subject to the terms of their original sentences and to the pro-
visions of law governing parole from the correctional institutions of the com-
monwealth.
Id. § 97.
50. 427 U.S. at 226.
51. The respondents argued that because many transfer decisions are based upon
charges of serious misconduct which may be erroneous, hearings should be held to
determine the validity of the charges before a transfer to a more confining institution
is effectuated. Id. at 228.
52. Id. For a discussion of the role of personal expectations in procedural due
process cases, see notes 18-24 and accompanying text supra.
53. 427 U.S. at 229-30.
54. Id. at 230. Justice Stevens had earlier elaborated:
If a man were a creature of the state, the analysis [of the majority] would
be correct. But neither the Bill of Rights nor the laws of sovereign States create
the liberty which the Due Process Clause protects. The relevant constitutional
provisions are limitations on the power of the sovereign to infringe on the liberty
of the citizen. The relevant state laws either create property rights, or they curtail
the freedom of the citizen who must live in an ordered society. Of course, law is
essential to the exercise and enjoyment of individual liberty in a complex society.
But it is not the source of liberty, and surely not the exclusive source.
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rights" while in the state's custody. 5 5 Thus, at a minimum, the Constitu-
tion guarantees a prisoner the right to be treated with dignity. 56 Observing
that imprisonment is intended to achieve not only a preventive but also a
rehabilitative function, the dissent stressed that an inmate has a right
to pursue his rehabilitative goals and maintain those attributes of dignity
associated with the status he has acquired at a particular institution. 7
While acknowledging that the state should have discretion in determining
both the conditions of confinement following an individual's conviction and
whether the inmate should be transferred,5 8 the dissent concluded that if
the change is "sufficiently grievous," due process protections must pre-
cede the transfer."" Under this standard, the respondents in the instant
case should have been afforded an adequate hearing prior to transfer since,
as the dissent made clear in apparent reference to Wolff,6 0 there was
little difference "between a transfer from the general prison population to
55. Id. at 232, quoting United States ex re. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701,
712 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974). Justice Stevens argued that
Morrissey should not be narrowly limited by the distinction between incarceration and
the conditional liberty of parole. 427 U.S. at 232. In his view, Morrissey required
that due process protections precede any substantial deprivation of the liberty of in-
dividuals in the custody of the state. Id. at 234. In Meachum, Justice Stevens re-
affirmed his prior interpretation of Morrissey stating that Morrissey stood for the
basic concept that the liberty protected by the due process clause must to some extent
coexist with incarceration. Id. at 231-33; see United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey,
479 F.2d 701, 712 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146. He argued that the
limiting of the Morrissey analysis to parole situations creates a false distinction, since
in both the cases of Morrissey's parole and Meachum's imprisonment the state
maintained legal custody over the individuals. 427 U.S. at 232.
Although the majority did not consider Morrissey in its opinion, it is sug-
gested that they distinguished that case from Meachum because of the Morrissey
Court's emphasis upon the permission given to parolees to live outside of the institution.
It was this distinction between in-prison and out-of-prison to which Justice Stevens
objected. Id. For a discussion of Morrissey, see notes 31-33 and accompanying
text supra.
56. 427 U.S. at 231-32.
57. Id. at 234.
58. Id. at 234. Justice Stevens stated:
To supervise and control its prison population, the State must retain the power
to change the conditions for individuals, or for groups of prisoners, quickly and
without judicial review. In many respects the State's problems in governing its
inmate population are comparable to those encountered in governing a military
force. Prompt and unquestioning obedience by the individual, even to commands
he does not understand, may be essential to the preservation of order and dis-
cipline. Nevertheless, within the limits imposed by the basic restraints governing
the controlled population, each individual retains his dignity and, in time, acquires
a status that is entitled to respect.
Id.
59. Id. The dissent, however, failed to expound more fully upon the definition
of "sufficiently grievous."
60. Although Justice Stevens did not mention Wolff in this statement, it is evi-
dent that he was referring to that decision's holding that an inmate must be given
notice and a factfinding hearing before the state can deprive him of good time credits
or place him in solitary confinement. For a discussion of Wolff, see notes 36-38
and accompanying text supra.
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solitary confinement and a transfer involving equally disparate conditions
between one physical facility and another." 6' 1
In focusing upon the nature of the interest involved to ascertain
whether it is within the contemplation of the "liberty" or "property" lan-
guage of the fourteenth amendment, the Meachum decision is consistent
with recent Supreme Court opinions.6 2 It is submitted, however, that the
majority, in stressing that procedural protections cannot be invoked
merely because a grievous loss has been inflicted upon an individual by
the state63 and that the analysis must instead focus upon determining the
nature of the interest,64 is subject to criticism because of its failure to
analyze fully the nature of the inmates' interests in both remaining at a
particular institution and being free from unjust punishment. In reaching
its conclusions, the Meachum Court relied too heavily upon the amount of
discretion that Massachusetts law had given its prison administrators. 65
This reflects the view taken by the Court in two other cases66 decided
61. 427 U.S. at 235.
62. See notes 17-24 and accompanying text supra.
63. The First Circuit had determined that the inmates in Meachum were entitled
to procedural protection because of the extent of their loss. 520 F.2d at 378. This
confusion in applying a test for determining whether due process procedures will be
extended can be traced back to the Supreme Court's opinion in Morrissey, where the
Court stated: "Whether any procedural protections are due depends on the extent to
which an individual will be 'condemned to suffer a grievous loss.'" 408 U.S. at 481,
quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951).
However, the Court's decision in Roth made it clear that the analysis must focus upon
the nature and not the weight of the interest sought to be protected to determine if
it is within the meaning of liberty or property. For a discussion of Roth, see notes
18-20 and accompanying text supra.
64. See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
65. See notes 49-52 and accompanying text supra.
66. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) ; Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976).
In Bishop, a former police officer brought an action under section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, alleging that he had been deprived of liberty and property
without due process of law in that he had been discharged from his job without a
hearing. 426 U.S. at 343. His claimed property interest rested upon his right to
continued employment, while he claimed his liberty was deprived by the damage to
his reputation resulting from the allegations leading to his discharge. Id. at 343, 347.
The Supreme Court held that the individual's claimed property and liberty interests
were insufficient to invoke the protections of the due process clause. Id. at 347-48. The
Court reasoned that, since state law required only that an employee be given written
notice of the grounds for discharge, no enforceable expectation of continued public
employment could exist. Id. at 345-47. The Court also dismissed the individual's
liberty claim stating that there had been no damage to his reputation since the reasons
for his discharge had not been made public. Id. at 348.
In Paul v. Davis, plaintiff also sued under section 1983, claiming that he had
been deprived of liberty without due process of law by the actions of the police in
distributing to local merchants a circular of "Active Shoplifters" which included his
name and picture. 96 S. Ct. at 1157-59. Although plaintiff's name appeared on the
list as a result of his being arrested for shoplifting at the time of the distribution of
the circular, his guilt or innocence had not been established. Id. at 1158. In fact the
charge was dismissed soon after the circulars had been distributed. Id. Plaintiff
claimed that the action taken by the police would "inhibit him from entering business
establishments for fear of being suspected of shoplifting and possibly apprehended,
and would seriously impair his future employment opportunities." Id. at 1159. While
acknowledging the serious effects of the police action upon the individual, the Supreme
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last term, wherein the Court seemingly adopted a rigid analysis of the
interests involved whereby the determining factor is whether the interest
is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights or recognized by the states.67 Addi-
tionally, in examining state recognition of a particular interest, the Court
has narrowed its inquiry substantially by looking more toward state lav
rather than less formal indications of state recognition." As a result,
the Court failed to consider two substantial factors in Meachum.
First, the majority did not consider Justice Stevens' argument that
the Court's decision in Morrissey recognized that an individual retains an
amount of conditional liberty after he has been convicted.6 9 Indeed, in
Morrissey, state law authorized its parole board to use its discretion in
terminating an individual's parole. 70 However, the Court ignored that
fact, focusing instead upon the parolee's "core values of unqualified
liberty."171 Such an interest was recognized not only in Morrissey but
also in Wolff, where the inmates were allowed some protection against
arbitrary prison disciplinary measures.72 Recognition of the fact that an
,Court held that the damage to plaintiff's reputation did not constitute a deprivation of
his liberty. Id. at 1166-67. The Court distinguished its prior decisions in Wisconsin
v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), and Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975),
noted in 20 VILL. L. REV. 1069 (1974-75), which seemed to stand for the proposition
that one's reputation was protected by the due process clause. According to the Court,
those cases involved not only damage to the individuals' reputations but also the
deprivation of rights granted by state law (in Constantineau, the right to purchase
liquor; in Goss, the right to attend school). 96 S. Ct. at 1164-65. However, in the
Davis case the Court found no "legal guarantee of present enjoyment of reputation"
in the state statute and concluded that the plaintiff's reputation was not protected
by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 1166.
67. See 427 U.S. at 229-30; 96 S. Ct. at 1165 & n.5. Justice Stevens, in his dis-
senting opinion in Meachurn, stated:
The Court indicates that a "liberty interest" may have either of two sources.
According to the Court, a liberty interest may "originate in the Constitution"...
or it may have "its roots in state law."..... Apart from those two possible origins,
the Court is unable to find that a person has a constitutionally protected interest
in liberty.
427 U.S. at 230. (citations omitted).
Justice Rehnquist, in writing for the Davis majority, stated: "There are other
interests, of course, protected not by virtue of their recognition by the law of a par-
ticular State, but because they are guaranteed in one of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights which has been 'incorporated' into the Fourteenth Amendment." 96 S. Ct.
at 1165 n.5.
68. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. at 229-30; Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. at 344-47.
69. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
70. Iowa law provides: "All paroled prisoners shall remain, while on parole, in
the legal custody of the warden or superintendent and under the control of the chief
parole officer, and shall be subject, at any time, to be taken into custody and re-
turned to the institution from which they were paroled." IowA CODE § 247.9 (1975).
71. 408 U.S. at 482. For a discussion of Morrissey, see notes 31-33 & 55 and
accompanying text supra.
72. 418 U.S. at 555. The Wolff Court stated:
Petitioners assert that the procedure for disciplining prison inmates for
serious misconduct is a matter of policy raising no constitutional issue. If the
position implies that prisoners in state institutions are wholly without the pro-
tections of the Constitution and the Due Process Clause, it is plainly untenable.
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inmate retains a limited form of liberty necessarily leads to the conclu-
sion that a prisoner "retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except
those expressly or by necessary implication taken from him by law"7 3 and
that "any further restraints or deprivations in excess of that inherent in
the sentence and in the normal structure of prison life should be subject to
judicial scrutiny. '74 It is submitted that a transfer from the general prison
population to a maximum security institution, which is set aside for more
dangerous inmates, is such a restraint.
While prison officials must have the authority to transfer inmates to
ensure the welfare of the prison system, some procedure should take place
to ensure that the transfer is being made for a valid state purpose. The
Court has recognized that the form of a due process hearing varies with
each situation depending upon the respective interests of the individual
and the state. 75  It is submitted therefore, that the hearings required
before a transfer can be effectuated should differ depending upon whether
the transfer is being made for administrative or disciplinary purposes.
When the transfer is made for administrative purposes, such as to reduce
overcrowded conditions or to protect an inmate from possible harm, the
inquiry should focus solely upon whether a legitimate state need exists and
therefore, whether a less formal hearing is appropriate. However, a formal
hearing should be held when a disciplinary transfer is involved because the
state's action is predicated solely upon the inmate's alleged wrongdoing.
Since the state has no legitimate interest in punishing an innocent party, a
fact-finding hearing must be held in order to provide the inmate an oppor-
tunity to vindicate himself.76 It would seem that Justice Harlan's notion
of due process as ensuring fundamental fairness 77 mandates such a pro-
tection before one is punished for his alleged misconduct.
78
the ordinary citizen, a "retraction justified by the considerations underlying our
penal system." But though his rights may be diminished by the needs and exigen-
cies of the institutional environment, a prisoner is not wholly stripped of con-
stitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime.
Id., quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
73. Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 532 (5th Cir. 1968), quoting Coffin v.
Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945).
74. Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 535 (5th Cir. 1968).
75. See note 17 supra.
76. In Morrissey, the Supreme Court recognized that, while the state has an
interest in being able to return a parolee to the prison should he fail to abide by the
conditions of his parole, it has no interest in revoking the parole without first deter-
mining whether the alleged misconduct had in fact occurred. 408 U.S. at 483-84.
77. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
78. The Second Circuit, in Haymes v. Montayne, 505 F.2d 977 (2d Cir. 1974),
rev'd, 427 U.S. 236 (1976), ruled that an inmate was entitled to due process protec-
tions before a transfer could be effectuated when the transfer was a punishment. In
distinguishing between administrative and disciplinary transfers the court stated:
When harsh treatment is meted out to reprimand, deter, or reform an individual,
elementary fairness demands that the one punished be given a satisfactory oppor-
tunity to establish that he is not deserving of such handling. . . . [T]he specific
facts upon which a decision to punish are predicated can most suitably be ascer-
tained at an impartial hearing to review the evidence of the alleged misbehavior,
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Secondly, in limiting its inquiry into the state's recognition of the inter-
ests of the prisoner solely upon the state's transfer statute and the inmate's
expectations upon reading it, the Meachum Court failed to consider fully
whether the state had afforded recognition of the inmates interests. Consid-
ering the Court's opinion in Perry, where it was recognized that while purely
subjective expectations are irrelevant, "'a person's interest in a benefit is a
property interest for due process purposes if there are such rules or mu-
tually explicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement,' "7 the
inmate may have a protected interest if the state has, by its rules, regula-
tions, or practices, fostered his expectation of having the right.80 The
Meachum majority reasoned that in light of the prison administrators'
discretion, the inmates could have no legitimate expectation of remaining
at Norfolk even if they abided by the rules.8 ' The Court ignored the
practices and norms of the institution and the general expectations of its
prisoners. It is submitted, however, that had the Court looked beyond the
language of the statutes which granted the authority to the prison officials,
2
it may have reached a different conclusion.
Notwithstanding prison officials' discretion, the state, through its
actions, may have sufficiently created an understanding with its inmates
as to render legitimate their expectations in remaining at an institution.
Recognizing that one of the objectives of incarceration is the rehabilita-
tion of the offender, 3 prison administrators have established a prison
system with graduated conditions of confinement.8 4 These range from
minimum security institutions, which allow inmates a greater degree of
mobility and provide the most extensive rehabilitation programs, to maxi-
mum security institutions, reserved for the more dangerous inmates and
and to assess the effect which the transfer will have on the inmate's future
incarceration.
505 F.2d at 980.
The Supreme Court reversed, citing its opinion in Meachum and stating that,
for due process purposes, it is insignificant whether the transfer was made for
administrative or disciplinary purposes for, as long as state law provided its prison
administrators with the discretion to transfer, due process protections would not be
required. 427 U.S. at 242-43.
79. 408 U.S. at 601, quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
80. For a discussion of Perry, see notes 21-24 and accompanying text supra.
81. See notes 51 & 52 and accompanying text supra.
82. For the text of the statutes, see note 49 supra.
83. For example, Massachusetts law provides for the commissioner of correc-
tions to
establish, maintain and administer programs of rehabilitation, including but not
limited to education, training and employment, of persons committed to the custody
of the department, designed as far as practicable to prepare and assist each such
person to assume the responsibilities and exercise the rights of a citizen of the
commonwealth ....
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 124, § 1(e) (West 1974).
84. See American Correctional Ass'n, Development of Modern Correctional
Concepts and Standards, in CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 17, 33 (R. Carter, D. Glaser
& L. Wilkins eds. 1972); The President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement and Adminis-
tration of Justice, State Correctional Institutions for Adults, in CORRECTIONAL INSTI-
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thus offering less mobility and fewer rehabilitation programs.85 Prison
authorities make a determination after a conviction as to which of its
institutions will best satisfy the needs of the offender and the objectives
of the state.86 It is submitted that the state, in sending an inmate to an
institution that provides him with the means to rehabilitate himself, has
created a protected interest by fostering a mutual understanding that the
inmate will remain as long as the objectives of the prison system are
being met.8 7 Since the state has no legitimate interest in transferring
prisoners except for cause,88 inmates have a legitimate expectation that
they will be transferred only for valid reasons. Even when a transfer is
made for disciplinary purposes - an admittedly valid reason for trans-
fer - the minimum safeguards of due process should be met to ensure
that the state is disciplining the right inmate, for again the state has no
interest in punishing the innocent. The inmates' expectations are further
reinforced in the Meachum situation where the prison authorities have
set up certain procedures which precede an actual disciplinary transfer.8 9
The impact of an erroneous determination by the state upon an inno-
cent inmate can be quite serious. In most cases, a transferee is placed in
administrative segregation upon his arrival; long-distance transfers ef-
fectively sever communication with his family, friends, and attorney; and
the educational and psychological therapy programs in which he was
engaged will probably be unavailable in the less favorable institution. 0
Unfortunately, the Court's decision allows these substantial losses to be
inflicted suddenly upon every individual in the state's institutions, leaving
the inmates defenseless against nameless and faceless informants, unfriendly
85. The President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,
State Correctional Institutions for Adults, in CORRECTIONA INSTITUTIONs 35 (R.
Carter, D. Glaser & L. Wilkins eds. 1972).
86. For example, Massachusetts law provides for the commissioner of correc-
tions to "establish a system of classification of persons committed to the custody of the
department for the purpose of developing a rehabilitation program for each such
person . . . ." MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 124, § 1(f) (West 1974).
87. This was the view adopted by the court of appeals in Meachum, which noted:
"It makes no difference that the Commonwealth need not have created a corrections
system containing institutions with divergent conditions of confinement. The ad-
vantages of confinement in a more desirable institution are in this regard similar to
the state-created right to good time credits which was involved in Wolff .... " 520
F.2d at 379 n.6, citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-58 (1974).
88. The Morrissey Court, in focusing upon the interests of all the parties in-
volved in the revocation of parole, stated that society has a stake in whatever may
be the chance of restoring a prisoner to a normal and useful life and, thus, that
society's interests are not served when a parole has been revoked on the basis of
erroneous information. 408 U.S. at 483-84. The Court further noted that the ques-
tion of the prison official's discretion in the revocation decision need not even be
reached until after there has been an appropriate determination that the individual
had indeed participated in conduct that breached his parole conditions. Id.
89. See notes 2, 4 & 5 and accompanying text supra.
90. Gomes v. Travisono, 353 F. Supp. 457 (D.R.I. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 490 F.2d 1209 (1st Cir. 1973), vacated, 418 U.S. 909 (1974).
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guards, and insensitive prison officials. The inmate is rendered a "slave
of the State,"9' unable to combat arbitrary decisionmaking.
Although the Meachum Court's holding affects only intrastate trans-
fers9 2 in those states that have not provided inmates a right to a hearing
prior to a transfer, it has nevertheless dealt a severe blow to the recent
prison reform movement. As a result of the Court's analysis, prisoners
may have no more freedom than the state decides to grant them. Further-
more, dicta in the majority's opinion emphasizing the need for prison
administrators' discretion in dealing with inmates and declaring that federal
judges do not sit to administer the functioning of state prisons93 can be
interpreted as a substantial step towards the revival of the "hands-off doc-
trine."94 Such a return would unfortunately leave incomplete the reforms
the courts have made in the corrections area during the early part of this
decade.9 5
Thomas I. McGarrigle
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FOURTH AMENDMENT - EXCLUSIONARY
RULE NOT APPLICABLE IN FEDERAL CIVIL TAX PROCEEDINGS WHERE
EVIDENCE WAS EXCLUDED IN STATE CRIMINAL PROCEEDING.
United States v. Janis (U.S. 1976)
Acting pursuant to a warrant directing a search for bookmaking ma-
terials, a Los Angeles police officer arrested respondent Janis and seized
wagering records and $4,940 in cash.' The officer informed an agent of the
91. In his dissent in Meachum, Justice Stevens stated that "if the inmate's pro-
tected liberty interests are no greater than the State chooses to allow, he is really
little more than the slave described in the 19th century cases." 427 U.S. at 233. The
"slave of the State" doctrine held that a prisoner rescinded all of his rights and that
the state could deal with him as it pleased. See Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21
Gratt.) 790, 794-96 (1871).
92. 427 U.S. at 229. The Meachum Court stated: "The individual States, of
course, are free to follow another course, whether by statute, by rule or regulation or
by interpretation of their own constitutions. They may thus decide that prudent
prison administration requires pretransfer hearings. Our holding is that the Due
Process Clause does not impose a nationwide rule mandating transfer hearings." Id.
93. Id. at 228-29.
94. See notes 26 & 27 and accompanying text supra.
95. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (due process in prison
disciplinary hearings) ; Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (mail censorship
and restrictive legal visitation regulations) ; Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973)
(due process in probation revocation hearings); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972) (due process in parole revocation hearings); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319
(1972) (freedom of religion); Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (access
to courts).
1. United States v. Janis, 96 S. Ct. 3021, 3023 (1976). An accomplice, Morris
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Internal Revenue Service (IRS) of the arrests.2 Since Janis had not filed
wagering tax returns, the IRS computed an assessment for the unpaid
taxes based exclusively upon the records seized3 and levied upon the $4,940
in partial satisfaction of the assessment.4 In a state criminal proceeding
instituted for violation of gambling laws, the court granted Janis' motion to
quash the search warrant as violative of the fourth amendment.5 All seized
items were ordered returned except the cash that had been levied upon by
the IRS.6 After rejection of his claim for a refund of the retained money,
Janis commenced a civil action for a refund in federal court; the Govern-
ment counterclaimed for the balance of the tax assessment.7 Janis moved
to suppress the illegally seized evidence and quash the assessment.8
The United States District Court for the Central District of California,
concluding that the assessment was invalid because the evidence upon which
2. Id. at 3023.
3. Id. at 3024. The assessment was made pursuant to section 4401 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (Code), which states:
(a) WAGERS - There shall be imposed on wagers, as defined in section 4421,
an excise tax equal to 10 percent of the amount thereof.
(c) PERSONS LIABLE FOR TAX - Each person who is engaged in the business
of accepting wagers shall be liable for and shall pay the tax under this subchapter
on all wagers placed with him. Each person who conducts *any wagering pool
or lottery shall be liable for and shall pay the tax under this subchapter on all
wagers placed in the pool or lottery. Any person required to register under
section 4412 who receives wagers for or on behalf of another person without
having registered under section 4412 the name and place of residence of such
other person shall be liable for and shall pay the tax under this subchapter on all
such wagers received by him.
I.R.C. § 4401. The total assessment amounted to $89,026.09 plus $123.97 interest,
96 S. Ct. at 3024.
4. Id. The IRS has authority to levy upon funds under section 6331 of the
Code, I.R.C. § 6331. Subsection (b) of this provision states that the term "levy"
includes the power of distraint and seizure by any means and extends only to "property
possessed and obligations existing at the time thereof." Id. § 6331 (b).
5. 96 S. Ct. at 3024. The fourth amendment states:
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
U. S. CONST. amend. IV.
In determining that the warrant violated Janis' fourth amendment rights, the
Court relied upon Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), decided three weeks
before the criminal proceeding against Janis was begun, 96 S. Ct. at 3024. In Spinelli,
a search warrant was held to be deficient because it was based upon an informant's
tip, which did not constitute probable cause as required by the fourth amendment.
393 U.S. at 418. The state court determination in Janis was not at issue before the
Supreme Court.
6. 96 S. Ct. at 3024.
7. Janis v. United States, 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 81,391 (C.D. Cal. 1973). Only
Mr. Janis was a respondent in the refund case because it was his money that was
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it was based was seized in violation of the fourth amendment,9 ordered the
assessment quashed and granted a refund.' 0 The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed." On a writ of certiorari,' 2 the United States Su-
preme Court reversed, holding "that the judicially created exclusionary
rule should not be extended to forbid the use in a civil proceeding of one
sovereign of evidence seized by a criminal law enforcement agent of another
sovereign." United States v. Janis, 96 S. Ct. 3021, 3035 (1976).
The exclusionary rule developed as an exception to the common law
doctrine that the admissibility of evidence did not depend upon the manner
in which it was obtained.' 3 Designed to exclude evidence garnered in vio-
lation of the search and seizure provision of the fourth amendment,' 4 the
rule was vigorously and broadly applied by the Warren Court,' 5 which
elevated it to constitutional status' 6 and emphasized its twofold purpose -
the deterrence of unlawful police conduct17 and the preservation of judicial
integrity.' 8
9. Id. at 81,393. Specifically, the court held:
The civil excise tax assessment ... was based substantially upon evidence illegally
obtained from the above described search and seizure; and, as a consequence
thereof, such assessment, although civil in nature, is invalid and must be sup-
pressed and quashed as being violative of the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights
to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.
Id. (emphasis supplied by the Court).
10. Id.
11. 96 S. Ct. at 3025. Both the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the
district court were affirmed by the appellate court in an unpublished opinion. Id.
12. 421 U.S. 1010 (1975).
13. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886) ; Comment, The Appli-
cability of the Exclusionary Rule to Civil Cases, 19 BAYLOR L. REv. 263, 263 (1967);
Note, The Fourth Amendment Right of Privacy: Mapping the Future, 53 VA. L. Rxv.
1314, 1316 (1967).
14. For the text of the fourth amendment, see note 5 supra.
15. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (all evidence obtained by
search and seizure in violation of the Constitution inadmissible in a state court);
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (evidence illegally obtained by state
officials inadmissible in a Federal criminal trial).
16. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court overruled Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949), which had permitted the use in state criminal proceedings of
evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure by state officials. 367 U.S. at
653. The Mapp Court, in holding that unconstitutionally seized evidence is inadmissible
in state criminal proceedings, stressed that the exclusionary rule was an "essential
part" of the right to privacy guaranteed by the fourth and fourteenth amendments.
367 U.S. at 655-57.
17. In United States v. Elkins, 367 U.S. 206 (1960), the Court stated: "The
rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter - to compel respect
for the constitutional guarantee in the only effectively available way - by removing
the incentive to disregard it." Id. at 217.
18. The concept of judicial integrity - that courts should not engage in or
encourage constitutional violations - has been explained by the Court as follows:
If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in
the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means - to declare
that the Government may conimit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a
private criminal - would bring terrible retribution.
Id. at 223 (1960) (citation omitted); see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 647, 659 (1961).
19
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In recent years, however, the Court's philosophy with respect to the
exclusionary rule has altered significantly. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,"9 stressed the short-
comings of the rule and urged that its application be restricted.20 Subse-
quently, in United States v. Calandra,2' which held that the exclusionary
rule did not preclude the use of illegally obtained evidence in a grand jury
proceeding, 22 the Court stressed that the exclusionary rule was not a con-
stitutional right,28 but rather a judicially created remedy24 designed pri-
marily to protect fourth amendment rights by deterring illegal police con-
duct.25 Significantly, the Calandra Court utilized a balancing test to weigh
the deterrent effect of the rule against society's interest in having the
evidence admitted.26 Decisions following Calandra have adhered to this
balancing analysis in circumscribing the scope of the rule's applicability.27
19. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
20. Id. at 411-24 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger stated:
"Although unfortunately ineffective, the exclusionary rule has increasingly been char-
acterized by a single, monolithic, and drastic judicial response to all official violations
of legal norms." Id. at 418 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). After -examining both the
rule's deterrent effect and society's interest in effective law enforcement, he concluded
that "the time has come to re-examine the scope of the exclusionary rule and consider
at least some narrowing of its thrust so as to eliminate the anomolies it has produced."
Id. at 424 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
21. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
22. Id. at 354.
23. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
24. 414 U.S. at 348. The Court, noting that the rule had never been applied in
all situations, stated:
As with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been restricted to
those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served
.... Thus, standing to invoke the exclusionary rule has been confined to situations
where the Government seeks to use such evidence to incriminate the victim of an
unlawful search.
Id. (citations omitted).
25. The court thus indicated the primacy of deterrence, rather than judicial in-
tegrity, as the underlying purpose of the exclusionary rule. See Stone v. Powell, 96
S. Ct. 3037, 3047-48 (1976); note 18 and accompanying text supra; note 53 and
accompanying test infra.
26. 414 U.S. at 349-52, 354. The Court stated:
Whatever deterrence of police misconduct may result from the exclusion of
illegally seized evidence from criminal trials, it is unrealistic to assume that
application of the rule to grand jury proceedings would significantly further that
goal .... We therefore decline to embrace a view that would achieve a speculative
and undoubtedly minimal advance in the deterrence of police misconduct at the
expense of substantially impeding the role of the grand jury.
Id. at 351-52. While the balancing test may have originated in the decisions of the
Warren Court (see, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965)), it lay relatively
dormant until Calandra and succeeding Burger court rulings. See note 27 and ac-
companying text infra.
27. For example, in Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976), decided the same
day as Janis, the Court held where the state has allowed a full and fair litigation of a
claim based upon the fourth amendment, federal habeas corpus relief will not lie for
an allegation that the evidence used in the trial was unconstitutionally obtained. Id. at
3052. Applying the balancing test, the Court concluded that the costs to society
outweighed any contribution of the exclusionary rule to the enforcement of the fourth
amendment. Id. at 3049-52. For other recent cases restricting both the areas to
1976-1977]
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Few decided cases have involved factual circumstances identical to
those presented in Janis. While the exclusionary rule has been applied to
various types of criminal proceedings, state and federal, in which evidence
was unconstitutionally obtained by law enforcement officials,28 it has rarely
been applied to purely civil actions between private parties.29 However,
the rule has on occasion been invoked in "quasi-criminal" 30 actions even
though they involved civil rather than criminal proceedings. In One 1958
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,31 the Court held that the exclusionary
which the rule applies and the scope of the fourth amendment protection in general,
see note 78 infra.
28. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (evidence obtained by illegal
search and seizure inadmissible in state court) ; Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206
(1960) (evidence illegally obtained by state officials inadmissible in federal criminal
trial); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (precluding
all uses of illegally obtained evidence in course of a criminal prosecution) ; Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (items seized from defendant's home without
appropriate warrants held inadmissible) ; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)
(because demand to produce invoice to ascertain custom duties violated fourth amend-
ment, its admission as evidence was erroneous).
29. For example, in Sackler v. Sackler, 16 App. Div. 2d 423, 229 N.Y.S.2d 61
(Sup. Ct. 1962), a divorce action in which a wife moved to suppress evidence of her
adultery obtained by her husband in a raid on her apartment, the court held that the
exclusionary rule could not be applied to suppress the evidence because it was obtained
by a private person and because the case was civil in nature. Id. at 425, 229 N.Y.S.2d
at 63. In so ruling, the court followed Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921),
in which the Supreme Court held that evidence obtained by private parties and then
given to the government was admissible. 16 App. Div. 2d at 425, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 63,
citing Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921). See also Drew v. International
Bhd. of Sulphite & Paper Mill Workers, 37 F.R.D. 446 (D.D.C. 1965).
The rule, however, has been applied in private actions involving replevin.
See Chemielewski v. Rosetti, 59 Misc. 2d 335, 298 N.Y.S.2d 875 (Sup. Ct. 1969);
Reyes v. Rosetti, 47 Misc. 2d 517, 262 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1969). Moreover,
in Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958), blood tests taken without
consent were found to violate the constitutional right of privacy, but their admission
in a civil action was held to be harmless error. Id. at 440-41, 93 N.W.2d at 287.
See generally, Note, 55 VA. L. REV. 1484 (1969).
30. One authority has defined "quasi-criminal" actions as follows:
QUASI-CRIMES - This term embraces all offenses not crimes or mis-
demeanors, but that are in the nature of crimes - a class of offenses against the
public which have not been declared crimes, but wrongs against the general or
local public which it is proper should be repressed or punished by forfeitures
and penalties. This would embrace all qui tam actions and forfeitures imposed
for the neglect or violation of a public duty. A quasi crime would not embrace
an indictable offense, whatever might be its grade, but simply forfeitures for a
wrong done to the public, whether voluntary or involuntary, where a penalty is
given, whether recoverable by criminal or civil process.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 446 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (emphasis in the original).
31. 380 U.S. 693 (1965). In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, a car traveling from
New Jersey into Pennsylvania was found transporting liquor which lacked the re-
quired Pennsylvania tax seal. Id. at 694. A proceeding was instituted for forfeiture
of the car as provided by Pennsylvania state law. Id. at 694 & n.2. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, ruling that the exclusionary rule applied only to criminal, not civil
cases, found the evidence to be admisisble. Commonwealth v. One 1958 Plymouth
Sedan, 414 Pa. 540, 543-44, 201 A.2d 427, 429, aff'g 199 Pa. Super. Ct. 428, 186 A.2d
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rule calls for suppression of illegally obtained evidence in a forfeiture pro-
ceeding.32 A similar result was reached by the Seventh Circuit in United
States v. $5,608.30, 33 wherein cash and currency were seized as evidence
of defendant's failure to register and pay taxes for bookmaking activities.3"
The court held that a motion to suppress evidence obtained by an allegedly
unconstitutional search and seizure should have been ruled upon because
of the quasi-criminal aspect of the forfeiture proceeding. 35
Prior to Janis, several lower courts had held that evidence unconstitu-
tionally obtained by state action would be excluded in a civil proceeding
in which the federal government was a party.36 Most significantly, in Suarez
v. Commissioner,3 7 the Tax Court held that evidence obtained in a raid by
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), that the exclusionary rule applied. 380
U.S. at 696, citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In Boyd, the Supreme
Court had stated:
[P]roceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man's
property by reason of offenses committed by him, though they may be civil in
form, are in their nature criminal . . . . As, therefore, suits for penalties and
forfeitures incurred by the commission of offenses against the law, are of this
quasi-criminal nature, we think that they are within the reason of criminal
proceedings for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution ....
116 U.S. at 634.
32. 380 U.S. at 702.
33. 326 F.2d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 1964).
34. Id. at 359-61.
35. Id. at 362. This case involved an action by the United States for forfeiture of
money seized for failure to pay or register for special taxes in connection with alleged
bookmaking activities. Id. at 359.
36. See, e.g., Berkowitz v. United States, 340 F.2d 168 (1st Cir. 1965) (items
seized incident to unlawful arrest and suppressed in previous criminal trial were ordered
returned in forfeiture proceeding, even though the federal government was involved
in the seizure and both procedures); Compton v. United States, 334 F.2d 212 (4th
Cir. 1964) (where the IRS learned of an arrest through the press, information ob-
tained from an unconstitutional search and seizure, although admissible for impeach-
ment purposes, could not be used as evidence in an action for a jeopardy assessment
and occupational taxes); Tovar v. Jarecki, 173 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1949) (where a
tax assessment was made after an IRS agent visited defendant in jail and the evidence
was suppressed in a criminal proceeding, the evidence was held to be inadmissible as a
basis for a tax assessment); Rogers v. United States, 97 F.2d 691 (1st Cir. 1938)
(where items seized were ordered returned to defendant due to an illegal warrant,
the evidence could not be used in an action to collect custom duties); Anderson v.
Richardson, 354 F. Supp. 363 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (in an arrest for a traffic violation
accompanied by an unconstitutional search and seizure and no Miranda warnings, the
IRS could not use the resulting information in a case involving a tax assessment);
United States v. Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Ohio 1966) (where an IRS agent
committed an illegal search and seizure, the evidence was held excluded in all pro-
ceedings, including a tax assessment) ; Lassoff v. Gray, 207 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Ky.
1962) (illegally seized evidence used to determine a tax held invalid); Suarez v.
Commissioner, 58 T.C. 792 (1972) (evidence illegally seized during a raid on an
abortion clinic was suppressed in a subsequent action for a deficiency in taxes). Contra,
Hinchcliff v. Clarke, 371 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 941 (1967);
see notes 65 & 69 infra.
37. 58 T.C. 792, 806 (1972). In Suares, the IRS learned of a raid on an abortion
clinic from the newspapers two or three days after the raid. Id. at 798. After a
1976-1977]
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the police was inadmissible not only in the resulting criminal action, but
also in a tax assessment proceeding brought by the IRS. 8 Janis finally
presented this question to the Supreme Court.
After discussing the burden of proof in tax proceedings,8 9 the Janis
Court, in an opinion by Justice Blackmun, turned to the primary issue -
the applicability of the exclusionary rule in the instant case. The Court,
surveying the evolution of the rule from Boyd to the present,40 stressed
that because the rule's primary purpose was to deter officials from violating
citizens' constitutional rights,41 only evidence that furthered this deterrence
function should be excluded.4 2 In Janis, however, the state law enforce-
ment official who had obtained and executed the warrant had already been
adequately "punished" by suppression of the evidence in all state and
federal criminal proceedings.43 Thus, concluded the Court, exclusion of
the wagering evidence in the federal civil tax proceeding would produce
prolonged series of appeals, evidence obtained in the raid was suppressed as unlawfully
obtained. Id. 798-99. The court, observing that "[tihe costs to society of applying
the exclusionary rule in civil tax cases are substantially less than in the criminal
area where the rule is well established," concluded that the goal of enforcing tax
liabilities must give way to the goal of protecting the individual and maintaining
confidence in government processes. Id. at 805.
38. Id. at 798-801.
39. 96 S. Ct. at 3025-26. A major issue in Janis was the presumption of correct-
ness in favor of the Government in a tax suit. The district court held that the burden
of proof in an assessment hearing, normally on the plaintiff, shifted to the Government;
thus, Janis had to prove only that the evidence upon which the assessment was based
was illegally obtained. Janis v. United States, 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 81,391, 81,393
(C.D. Cal. 1973).
The Supreme Court acknowledged that two types of tax proceedings were
involved in Janis. Regarding the first, Janis' suit for a refund, the Court cited Lewis
v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281 (1932), as having established the rule that the taxpayer
bears the burden of proving the amount he is entitled to recover; he cannot merely
establish that the assessment upon which the refund is claimed is erroneous. 96 S. Ct.
at 3025, citing Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281, 283 (1932). With respect to the
second type of tax proceeding, the Government's counterclaim for an additional col-
lection, the Court had not previously ruled upon the burden of proof. Such assessments,
however, have been held to contain a presumption of correctness. 96 S. Ct. at 3025-26.
The Court assumed, therefore, that the Government was correct in arguing that the
burden is usually upon the taxpayer to prove that he paid the correct amount, id. at
3026, but observed that if the assessment were found to be without any foundation, it
might not be subject to the same rule. Id. at 3026 (citations omitted). Acknowledging
that lower courts had disagreed as to the burden of proof where the assessment was
found to be without any foundation, the Court assumed, without deciding that the
burden fell on the Government that if the district court was correct in ruling that
the seized evidence should not be used, it was correct in granting judgments for the
plaintiff on both claims. Id. at 3026-27 (citations omitted).
40. Id. at 3027-29.
41. 96 S. Ct. at 3028, citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
See note 25 and accompanying text supra. The Court acknowledged, however, that
empirical studies designed to gauge the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule were
far from conclusive. 96 S. Ct. at 3030-32.
42. 96 S. Ct. at 3032 n.28, citing Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 254 n.24
(1969).
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only an "additional marginal deterrence" 44 insufficient to outweigh society's
interest in having the evidence admitted.4 5
With respect to respondent's argument that lower federal courts had
on several occasions applied the exclusionary rule in civil proceedings,' 6
the Court stated that because those decisions involved intrasovereign vio-
lations, in which the sovereign seeking to utilize the evidence also com-
mitted the violation, they were distinguishable from Janis, which involved
an intersovereign violation. 47  The Court disagreed with the decision of
the Tax Court in Suarez 8 - the one case squarely supporting respondent's
position 49 - on the ground that it failed to emphasize the element of
deterrence and to distinguish between inter- and intrasovereign uses of
the materials.50 In addition, the Court distinguished Janis, which involved
use of the evidence by a second sovereign in a civil proceeding, from
Elkins v. United States,51 which involved a criminal prosecution by the
44. Id. at 3032.
45. Id. The Court, reasoning that this conclusion would be reached under any
of the prevalent views concerning the efficacy of the exclusionary rule, stated:
If the exclusionary rule is the strong medicine that its proponents claim
it to be, then its use in the situation in which it is now applied (resulting, for
example, in this case in frustration of the Los Angeles police officers' good-faith
duties as enforcers of the criminal laws) must be assumed to be a substantial
and efficient deterrent. Assuming this efficacy, the additional marginal deterrence
provided by forbidding a different sovereign fiom using the evidence in a civil
proceeding surely does not outweigh the cost to society of extending the rule
to that situation. If, on the other hand, the exclusionary rule does not result in
appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use in the instant situation is unwarranted.
If the exclusionary rule is not "strong medicine," but does provide some
marginal deterrence in the criminal situations in which it is now applied, the
marginal deterrence is diluted by the attenuation existing when a different
sovereign uses the material in a civil proceeding, and we must again find that the
marginal utility of the creation of such a rule is outweighed by the costs it imposes
on society.
Id. at 3032 & n.27.
46. For the cases cited by respondent, as well as other cases similarly applying
the rule, see 96 S. Ct. at 3032-33 n.30; note 36 supra.
47. Id. at 3032-33. The Court stated that it was not ruling on the applicability of
the exclusionary rule when an agreement between, or participation by, both sovereigns
had been established. Id. at 3033 n.31.
48. 58 T.C. 792 (1972) ; see notes 37 & 38 and accompanying text supra.
49. 96 S. Ct. at 3033.
50. Id. at 3033-34.
51. 364 U.S. 206 (1960). Elkins held that the "silver platter" doctrine, which
allowed federal officials to use evidence illegally procured by state agents, was un-
acceptable and provided that any evidence obtained in this manner would be sup-
pressed. Id. at 208, 223; see notes 63-66 and accompanying text infra. In Elkins,
state officers obtained evidence through an unreasonable search and seizure. The
evidence found was not that for which the warrant was issued. Id. at 207 & n.1.
After a state proceeding was abandoned a federal proceeding was instituted. Id.
The Court held that evidence obtained by state officials in what would be an unreason-
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second sovereign.52 Finally, the Court noted that, in the instant case,
judicial integrity did not require exclusion, although it was another factor
to be weighed in the balancing process.53
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by justice Marshall,
stressing that the "exclusionary rule is a necessary and inherent constitu-
tional ingredient of the protections of the Fourth Amendment,"5 4 character-
ized Janis as another step in the Court's elimination of the exclusionary
rule.55 Justice Stewart, in a separate dissent, indicated that because the
civil proceeding in Janis was closely related to enforcement of the criminal
law,5 6 the evidence should have been excluded unless the Court was
abandoning Elkins.57
It is submitted that the Court's refusal to extend the exclusionary
rule to civil tax proceedings involving intersovereign constitutional viola-
52. 96 S. Ct. at 3034. According to the Court, this distinction further attenuated
the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. Id. The Court stated:
[C]ommon sense dictates that the deterrent effect of the exclusion of relevant
evidence is highly attenuated when the "punishment" imposed upon the offending
criminal enforcement officer is the removal of that evidence from a civil suit by
or against a different sovereign. In Elkins the Court indicated that the assumed
interest of criminal law enforcement officers in the criminal proceedings of another
sovereign counterbalanced this attenuation sufficiently to jusitfy an exclusionary
rule. Here, however, the attenuation is further augmented by the fact that the
proceeding is one to enforce only the civil law of the other sovereign.
Id. The Court reasoned that this attenuation, together with "the existing deterrence
effected by the denial of use of the evidence by either sovereign in the criminal trials
with which the searching officer is concerned," created a situation which "falls outside
the offending officer's zone of primary interest." Id.
53. Id. at 3034 n.35. The Court indicated that "judicial integrity" - the doctrine
that the courts cannot commit or encourage violations of the Constitution - does not
always call for the exclusion of evidence. Id. In questions concerning the fourth
amendment, the Court phrased the issue as whether the admission of the evidence
encourages violative conduct - an inquiry essentially similar to the inquiry into
whether exclusion would serve a deterrent purpose. Id. As to the situation presented
in Janis, the Court stated that "the admission of evidence in a federal civil proceeding
is simply not important enough to state criminal enforcement officers to encourage
them to violate Fourth Amendment rights (and thus to obtain evidence they are unable
to use in either state or federal criminal proceedings)." Id. For a brief discussion
of the doctrine of judicial integrity, see note 18 and accompanying text supra.
54. 96 S. Ct. at 3035 (Brennan, J.,dissenting), see United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 355-67 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. 96 S. Ct. at 3035 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see note 78 and accompanying
text infra.
56. 96 S. Ct. at 3035 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart noted that the
tax involved was levied upon wagering activities, an area in which there are criminal
statutes, and that the provisions not only raise revenue but aid police authorities in the
enforcement of penalties for such behavior. Id. Noting the close cooperation between
tax officials and both the federal and state law enforcement agents in this area, Justice
Stewart stated: "The pattern is one of mutual cooperation and coordination, with the
federal wagering tax provisions buttressing state and federal criminal sanctions ....
[T]he civil proceeding serves as an adjunct to the enforcement of the criminal law."
Id. at 3036; see notes 58 & 63-66 and accompanying text infra.
57. (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart was unable to reconcile the ma-
jority's decision in Janis with Elkins, which, according to his interpretation, "held that
evidence illegally seized by state officers cannot lawfully be introduced against a
defendant in a federal criminal trial." Id. at 3035 (Stewart, J., dissenting), citing
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tions was not the only conclusion that could have been reached on the facts
presented. Without extending the rule to all civil actions, the Court could
have excluded the evidence in Janis by focusing upon the manner in which
tax and criminal proceedings complement each other.5 8 The Supreme Court
has observed that a "tax" is a "penalty" when it is in a statute designed
to define and suppress crime.5 9 The tax in Janis was supplementary to the
criminal law and was, in fact, a penalty for the illegal activity of wagering.60
58. The close relationship between tax and criminal provisions was stressed by
Justice Stewart in his dissent in Janis. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
In Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968), a criminal proceeding in which
defendant was charged with violations of the wagering tax statutes, the Court, noting
that wagering is an area permeated with criminal statutes and that those engaged in
such activity are inherently suspect, held that the defendant could assert his fifth
amendment right in refusing to register for the wagering tax. Id. at 47, citing
Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965); see United States v. $5,608.30, 326
F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1964), in which a civil proceeding for forfeiture arising from a tax
on bookmaking activities was said to be technically a quasi-criminal proceeding. Id.
at 361; see notes 30-35 and accompanying text supra.
In Berkowitz v. United States, 340 F.2d 168 (1st Cir. 1965), where evidence
was suppressed in a criminal prosecution for willful violation of a wagering tax
statute, the court held that the evidence must also be excluded in the later civil
forfeiture proceeding. Noting that the right to privacy is greater than the need for
punishment and confiscation, id at 171, the court concluded that "[tihe Government
cannot be allowed to benefit from its infringement of Constitutional limitations." Id.
it 173. In United States v. Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180 (E.D. Ohio 1966), illegally seized
evidence that had been suppressed in a federal criminal prosecution was also found to
be inadmissible in a subsequent assessment proceeding. Id. at 184. The Blank court
stated :
Where, as here, there is a correlative civil action open to the Government
which imposes a penalty upon the citizen commensurate with the criminal sanctions
to which an accused, victimized by an illegal search, would be exposed, then we
see no distinguishable difference between the two forms of punishment which
excuses the government from complying with constitutional mandates when
prosecuting their action in a civil form.
Id. at 182
59. Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1922). The Lipke Court noted that
the purpose of a tax is to provide support for the Government, while the purpose of a
penalty is to punish individuals for violating the law. Id. at 562. One authority has
defined penalty as follows:
A punishment; a punishment imposed by statute as a consequence of the
commission of an offense . . . . Also money recoverable by virtue of a statute
imposing a payment by way of punishment.
To constitute a "punishment" or "penalty" there must be a deprivation of
property or some right, such as the enjoyment of liberty.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1290 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
The Supreme Court has stated that a condition of a penalty's imposition is
the requirement of notice and hearing. Regal Drug v. Wardell, 260 U.S. 386, 392
(1922).
60. As Justice Stewart, dissenting in Janis, observed, the wagering provisions
are intended not only to raise revenue, but also to "assist the efforts of state and
federal authorities to enforce [criminal] penalties" for unlawful wagering activities.
96 S. Ct. at 3035 (Stewart, J., dissenting), citing Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S.
39 (1968).
In Tovar v. Jarecki, 173 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1949), where evidence was sup-
pressed in a criminal prosecution due to unconstitutional search and seizure and an
1976-1977]
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Moreover, it is difficult to distinguish the tax involved from a forfeiture,
which has also been viewed as a penalty. 61 Both the car in One 1958
Plymouth Sedan62 and the money in Janis were used in activities that
violated the criminal law and both were seized unconstitutionally. Thus,
by characterizing the tax as a penalty or the money seized as a forfeiture,
the Court could have applied the exclusionary rule in Janis.
Moreover, the Court's distinction between inter- and intrasovereign
violations seems inconsistent with its holding in Elkins that evidence un-
constitutionally procured by state officials cannot be used by federal officials
in a federal criminal proceeding. 63 As did Janis, Elkins applied to a situa-
tion in which the federal sovereign did not participate in the original
violation ;64 in both cases the evidence was collected for the purpose of a
criminal prosecution.6 5 The Elkins Court implied that, generally, a dis-
tinction should not be drawn between the offending sovereign and the
sovereign attempting to use the evidence once the violation has occurred. 6
Janis, in effect, drew such a distinction by refusing to apply the rule to
assessment was made, based upon those materials, for a tax on marijuana, the plaintiff
sought an injunction to stop collection of the tax. Id. at 449. The district court found
the evidence to be inadmissible in a civil proceeding but dismissed the complaint
because it could not determine whether the assessment was based upon the evidence.
Tovar v. Jarecki, 85 F. Supp. 47, 49 (E.D. Ill. 1948). Characterizing the tax as a
penalty, the court of appeals reversed and granted an injunction to stop its collection,
stating :
We think it quite plain that this statute is a penal and not a revenue raising
statute .... Is it not perfectly plain that what the Government is trying to do
is to take this plaintiff's property ... for [his] not having a license to do some-
thing the Government did not want him to do without notice or hearing and by
means of its tax techniques when it could not convict for the same offense by a
fair trial in a criminal proceeding.
173 F.2d at 451.
61. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 701 (1965).
62. Id.; see notes 31 & 32 and accompanying text supra.
63. See note 51 and accompanying text supra. In Elkins, the Court stressed that
while cooperation between state and federal officers should be promoted, state officers
should not be encouraged to violate an individual's constitutional rights. 364 U.S. at
221-22.
64. The officer in Janis testified that as a matter of his own policy he reported
arrests, such as that involved, to the IRS. 96 S. Ct. at 3036 n.* (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
65. A different result has been reached when the evidence was initially obtained
for use by the IRS rather than for criminal prosecution. In Hinchcliff v. Clarke,
230 F. Supp. 91 (N.D. Ohio 1963), rev'd, 371 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1967), the district
court, suppressing an order for an accountant to produce documents because the docu-
ments were unconstitutionally discovered, stated: "[I]t appears appropriate that in
establishing the scope of the suppression order the Government should be forever
barred from using all evidence illegally obtained in any proceeding of any kind, and
should be further barred from reacquiring it by any means." 230 F. Supp. at 97. The
appellate court reversed, expressing the view that the rule should not be applied to
an administrative summons for records for use in a criminal proceeding when the
summons was authorized by a congressional enactment which had previously been
upheld. 371 F.2d at 701.
66. 364 U.S. at 215. The Court stated: "To the victim it matters not whether
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civil proceedings. 67 Because the action in Janis can be characterized as
quasi-criminal, it is submitted that the Janis Court should have followed
the Elkins rule rather than distinguishing Janis on the basis of its being
a civil tax proceeding.
Although the Court's perception that little deterrence would be gained
from excluding the seized materials is probably accurate, 68 the possibility
that at least some deterrence would ensue may warrant suppression. Under
the result reached in Janis, the breaching officer would know that the de-
fendant was paying for his crime even though criminal prosecution was
impossible. However, if the officer knew that the defendant would incur
no punishment, economic or otherwise, as a result of the evidence, he would
be deterred from his unconstitutional methods of procuring the evidence.
This should be sufficient to outweigh society's interests in having the evi-
dence included,69 especially since those interests would appear to be sig-
nificantly less in a civil tax proceeding than in a criminal proceeding. In
the former, the risk is that someone may avoid paying taxes that he ought
to pay; in the latter, the risk is that a criminal may escape prosecution and
incarceration. 70
Finally, while judicial integrity is no longer viewed as a major purpose
behind the exclusionary rule,71 it should nevertheless be given some defer-
ence. The Janis Court stated that judicial integrity means that the court
should not commit or encourage violations of the Constitution, but it dis-
missed that inquiry as "essentially the same as the inquiry into whether
exclusion would serve a deterrent purpose."72 In thus removing judicial
integrity as a principal consideration, the Janis Court in effect has told the
officer that if he obtains evidence in violation of the fourth amendment that
may be helpful to a governmental agency in a civil proceeding, the courts
will aid him in punishing the criminal through that medium.
67. 96 S. Ct. at 3035.
68. See 26 ARK. L. REv. 545, 550 (1972-73) (exclusionary rule not a deterrent
in tax courts); 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 197, 205-06 (1973).
69. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
70. Suarez v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 792, 805 (1972). The Suarez court stated:
"Surely the lesser objective of civil tax collection should not be accorded preferential
treatment over the greater objective of convicting the guilty criminal." Id. In Hinch-
cliff v. Clarke, 230 F. Supp. 91 (N.D. Ohio 1963), rev'd, 371 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1967),
the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio made the following observation:
[T]he factors mitigating against the suppression of such evidence [in a civil tax
proceeding] are far less satisfactory. Here there is no instance of turning hardened
and dangerous criminals loose upon society; here there is no instance of allowing
heinous and immoral crimes to go unpunished; here there is but the potentiality
of some slight decrease in the government revenues . . . . [I]t would be far more
appropriate, from the viewpoint of protecting society, that evidence be excluded
in civil tax cases than that it be excluded in criminal cases.
230 F. Supp. at 109.
71. See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
72. 96 S. Ct. at 3034 n.3 5 ; note 53 and accompanying text supra. But see Suarez,
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It is submitted that the Janis decision will cause unpredictability in
civil cases in which there has been an unreasonable search and seizure. For
example, lower courts will have to determine when there is or is not a
sufficient connection between the activities of the sovereign seeking use
of the evidence and those of the sovereign that procured it - a distinction
still vague following Janis.73 They will also have to determine whether
or not a particular case involves a forfeiture74 or qualifies as quasi-criminal, 75
since the Court has not overruled its earlier line of decisions in forfeiture
cases. 76 In short, the factual situations of each case will have to be scru-
tinized carefully to determine the category in which the case belongs.
Most significantly, Janis indicates that the trend toward the elimination
of the exclusionary rule, 77 as evidenced by the Burger Court's decisions in
recent years, 78 continues unabated. By sanctioning the admission of evi-
dence unconstitutionally obtained by one sovereign in civil proceedings tG
which the federal government is a party, Janis has furthered the steady
erosion of defendants' fourth amendment rights.
Susan Krouse
73. The Janis Court neither addressed the question of intrasovereign violations
nor defined the meaning of that term. See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
74. Had the suit been brought as a claim for the balance of the assessment
rather than as a counterclaim to Janis' claim for a refund, it is not clear whether
the court would have found that the assessment constituted a forfeiture, thereby making
the exclusionary rule applicable. See notes 61 & 62 and accompanying text supra.
75. The Janis Court did not discuss the quasi-criminal aspect of the tax proceed-
ing. See notes 30-35 & 58-60 and accompanying text supra.
76. See notes 30-35 and accompanying text supra.
77. See notes 19-27 supra.
78. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 96 S. Ct. 3092 (1976) (where police
searched a locked automobile impounded for parking violations, the Court found the
search not "unreasonable" and refused to suppress evidence found in locked glove com-
partment) ; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976) (fourth amend-
ment does not require warrants for searches conducted at permanent border check-
points) ; Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976) (where there has been an opportunity
for litigation of alleged fourth amendment claims in a state court, federal habeas
corpus relief will not be granted on the grounds that unconstitutionally obtained evi-
dence was introduced in a criminal proceeding) ; Andreson v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463(1976) (evidence obtained in search of business premises pursuant to warrant with
both general and specific descriptions not excluded because relevant to matter for
which warrant was issued) ; United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (where de-
fendant was on porch and retreated into her home while in the process of being
arrested, evidence obtained in warrantless search was admissible since porch was
"public" and officers were in "hot pursuit") ; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435(1976) (no fourth amendment interest in bank records); United States v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411 (1976) (evidence seized from car incident to warrantless arrest upon
probable cause held admissible) ; Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1976) (where de-
fendant's car was driven to police station at time of his arrest and was searched
without his permission, evidence obtained was held admissible) ; United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (where court ruled against general practice of police
conduct, officer had to have knowledge, real or constructive, of illegal character of
his actions) ; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (exclusionary rule
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CONSUMER LAW - TRUTH IN LENDING AcT - THE "MEANINGFUL
SEQUENCE" PROVISION OF REGULATION Z Is VIOLATED WHEN
CREDIT TERMS ARE NOT ARRANGED IN A LOGICAL AND SEQUENTIAL
ORDER AND CREDITOR Is LIABLE FOR VIOLATION TO ALL OBLIGORS
WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE REQUIRED TO RECEIVE A COPY OF THE
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT.
Allen v. Beneficial Finance Co. (7th Cir. 1976)
Plaintiff, Dorothy Allen, and her ex-husband renegotiated a consumer
loan with the defendant, Beneficial Finance Company of Gary, Inc.
(Beneficial).' Pursuant to the Federal Truth in Lending Act (Act),2
Beneficial prepared and the Allens signed a disclosure statement which
detailed the terms and conditions of the loan.3 Alleging that the disclosure
statement violated section 226.6(a) of Regulation Z,4 which requires,
inter alia, that all credit disclosures be made "in meaningful sequence," 5
Mrs. Allen filed suit against Beneficial.6 Beneficial argued in part that
under the terms of the Act7 the plaintiff, a co-borrower of the loan, could
not properly institute suit since she allegedly did not receive a copy of the
disclosure statement.8 The trial court, granting plaintiff's motion for sum-
mary judgment, found that Beneficial's disclosure statement violated Regu-
lation Z's "meaningful sequence" requirement and that plaintiff's receipt
or non-receipt of a copy of the disclosure statement would not affect her
right to recover." On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
1. Allen v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 531 F.2d 797, 799 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 237 (1976). The total amount financed was $1,769.58, which resulted in a
finance charge of $714.42 at an annual percentage rate of 23.54%. 531 F.2d at 799.
The loan was to be repaid in equal installments over a 36-month period. Id.
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). For a brief discussion
of the Truth in Lending Act (Act), see text accompanying notes 11-14 infra.
3. 531 F.2d at 799.
4. 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(a) (1976).
5. Section 226.6(a) provides in pertinent part: "[D]isclosures . .. shall be
made clearly, conspicuously, in meaningful sequence . . .and at the time and in the
terminology prescribed in applicable sections ...." Id.
6. Allen v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 393 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1975). Mr.
Allen signed Beneficial's credit disclosure statement as principal borrower with Mrs.
Allen signing as co-borrower. 531 F.2d at 808. Mr. Allen was not a party to this
action.
7. Section 121(b) of the Act provides: "If there is more than one obligor, a
creditor need not furnish a statement of information required under this chapter ...
to more than one of them." 15 U.S.C. § 1631(b) (Supp. V 1975).
8. 393 F. Supp. at 1384; see notes 25-27 and accompanying text infra.
9. 393 F. Supp. at 1385. In granting summary -judgment, the court stated
that the only fact which remained in controversy was "whether or not the plaintiff
received a copy of the disclosure statement." Id. at 1384. However, the court deter-
mined that since a creditor is not required to furnish a co-borrower with a copy
of the disclosure statement, the question need not be answered. Id., citing 15 U.S.C.§ 1631(b) (Supp. V 1975). For the pertinent text of this section, see note 7 supra.
The court specifically ruled that Mrs. Allen was "a proper person to sue and recover."
393 F. Sipp. at 1385.
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Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding 1) that Beneficial's disclosure statement
violated the "meaningful sequence" provision of section 226.6(a) by failing
to present its credit terms in a logical and sequential format, and 2) that
plaintiff was entitled to recover under the Act despite the fact that, because
of her status as co-borrower, Beneficial was not required to furnish her
with a copy of the disclosure statement. 10 Allen v. Beneficial Finance
Co., 531 F.2d 797 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 237 (1976).
The Federal Truth in Lending Act, which became effective on July
1, 1969, was designed "to assure meaningful disclosure of credit terms" to
facilitate a more informed examination and comparison of available credit
terms by consumers." Responsibility for implementation of the Act was
delegated to the Federal Reserve Board (Board),12 which subsequently
promulgated Regulation Z.18 Section 22 6.6(a) of Regulation Z provides
that all required disclosures by creditors be made "clearly, conspicuously,
[and] in meaningful seqtience."14 In the absence of further guidance from
the regulation's language, informal Board interpretations 5 and judicial
10. In addition, the Seventh Circuit rejected defendant's contention that the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment without allowing oral argument or sub-
mission of opposing material bn the ground that defendant failed to request a
hearing. 531 F.2d at 799-800, citing FED. R. Civ. P. 56 and N.D. IND. R. 7(b).
Defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of the meaningful sequence requirement
was not considered by the court, since defendant failed to raise the issue in the lower
court. 531 F.2d at 805, citing.N.D. IND. R. 16.
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. V. 1975). The Truth in Lending Act is the
first title of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1660 (1970 &
Supp. V 1975). See generally B. CLARK & J. FONSECA,' HANDLING CONSUMER CREDIT
CASES §§ 38-44 (1972 & Supp. 1976); Kintner, Henneberger & Neil, A Primer on
Truth in Lending, 13 ST. Louis U.L.J. 501 (1969); Comment, Truth in Lending
and the Statute of Limitatiohs, 21 VILL. L. REV. 904 (1975-76).
12. See 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970).
13. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.14 (1976). According to section 105 of the Act, the
purpose of Regulation Z is "to provide for adjustments and exceptions for any class
of transactions, as in the judgment of the Board are necessary or proper to effectuate
the purposes of [the Act],. to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate
compliance therewith." 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970).
14. 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(a) (1976). For the pertinent text of section 226.6(a),
see note 5 supra. Regulation Z implements the general disclosure rule of section
121(a) of the Act, which requires that "[e]ach creditor . . . disclose clearly and
conspicuously . . . to each person to' whom consumer credit is extended, the informa-
tion required . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § .1631(a) (Supp. V 1975).
15. Since 1969, the Board, in amending and interpreting Regulation Z, has issued
informal interpretations in letter form to answer inquiries regarding specific trans-
actions. Some of these staff opinion letters, referred to as public position letters, have
been made available to the Public. In the past, the Board has maintained the position
that "the public is entitled to rely on a formal staff opinion." [1969-1974 Transfer
Binder] CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCU) " 30,640, at 66,283. However, some courts have
asserted that the Board's interpretations are not necessarily determinative regarding
questions of law. See, e.g., Thomas v. Myers-Dickson Furniture Co., 479 F.2d 740,
747 (5th Cir. 1973) ; Rivers v. Southern Discount Co., 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH)
11 98,796, at 88,447 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 1973). Other courts, however, recognizing the
Board's administrative expertise and experience in construing these provisions, have
tended to defer to its construction of the Act and Regulation Z. See e.g., Philbeck
v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 499 F.2d 971, 977 (5th Cir. 1974) ; Bone v. Hibernia




Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1977
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
opinions have attempted to delineate specific requirements of the phrase
"meaningful sequence."
On two occasions prior to 1976, the Board responded to requests for
clarification of the meaningful sequence requirement' A 1971 Board public
position letter emphasized that while there were a "multitude of ways"
to comply with this provision, the obligation rested with the creditor "to
support his belief that his disclosures [met] the requirements of the
Regulation."'16 A warning that elements of the finance charge should not
be scattered throughout the disclosure statement was the only specific
example of a violation provided in the letter.17 In another letter issued
in 1974,18 the Board further clarified the meaningful sequence requirement
by providing that "meaningful sequence would call for those items which
are arithmetically related to appear within a reasonable proximity to each
other, not mixed with items which are irrelevant to a progression of
arithmetical computations or thought."' 9
Prior to the Allen decision, few courts had directly addressed the
"meaningful sequence" question. In Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc.,20
the court, interpreting a meaningful sequence provision of a state install-
ment sales act, held that compliance required that "those disclosures which
are logically related must be grouped together rather than scattered through
the contract." 2 1 However, in Barksdale v. Peoples Financial Corp.,22 the
court adopted a different approach, distinguishihg disclosure items of an
16. [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CONS. Cnz. Gumz (CCH) ff 30,759, at 66,333.
17. Id.
18. See [1974] 5 CoNs. CRD. GumE (CCH) 31,102, at 66,489.
19. Id. at 66,490. The Board reiterated, however, that it would be "difficult to
design an all-purpose type of disclosure statement" since "[t]he type of presentation
of disclosures will depend upon the complexity of the transaction and the ingenuity
of the designer of the disclosure form." Id. at 66,489.
20. 347 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Ill. 1972). Garza was a class action suit brought
against a health club corporation, which had entered into installment sales contracts
with the plaintiff class, and finance companies to 'which the contracts had been as-
signed. Id. at 958-59, 963. The defendants were charged with violations of both the
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1666 (1970,& Supp. V 1975), and the
Illinois Retail Installment Sales Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 , §§ 501-533 (1973),
for failing to disclose late payment charges and acceleration provisions. Id. at 958-63.
21. 347 F. Supp. at 961. Although the defendant in Garza was charged with
disclosure violations under both federal and state law, fhe court's definition of mean-
ingful sequence was placed in the section of the .opinion dealing with the state
sales act. Id., citing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121%, § 505 (1973). Since the concern of
both the state sales act in Garza and the Truth in Lending Act is to protect con-
sumers effectively, there is a strong argument; that a judicial interpretation of a
provision such as the meaningful sequence requirement could be applied to either.
The Allen court appears to have taken this position, -for in, citing Garza and applying
that court's reasoning to develop its own definition of nieaningful sequence, it made
no mention of the original applicability of the interpretation. See 531 F.2d at 801;
text accompanying notes 43 & 44 infra. But see Barksdale v. Peoples Fin. Corp., 393
F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Ga. 1975.), which indicated that the Garza interpretation should
be considered applicable solely to the construction of state law. Id. at 117. For a
discussion of Barksdale, see notes 22 & 23 and accompanying text infra.
22. 393 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Ga. 1975). Barksdale concerned alleged acceleration
clause, due date, and security interest disclosure violations by the defendant, who
had extended a consumer loan to the plaintiff. Id. at 113-14.
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arithmetic nature (e.g., finance charge) from those which were simply
"informative" (e.g., nonpayment rights and liabilities). 2 Citing the 1974
Board public position letter, the court concluded that the meaningful se-
quence requirement was not intended to apply to items which had "no
particular arithmetic interdependence. '2 4
The controversy regarding a creditor's liability to a co-borrower in-
volves two subsections of section 121 of the Act.25 While subsection (a)
requires that proper credit disclosures be made to "each person to whom
consumer credit is extended," 26 subsection (b) limits to one the number
of disclosure statements that a creditor must provide, regardless of the
number of obligors.27 The question upon which some courts have dis-
agreed is whether a creditor can be held liable under subsection (a) to a
joint obligor to whom there was no corresponding duty to provide a dis-
closure statement.
Several courts have denied separate recoveries to joint obligors who
were husband and wife. In St. Marie v. Southland Homes, Inc.,28 the
court stated that although "the manner in which the Act requires disclosure
is not conclusive in interpreting the penalty provision, it is persuasive. '29
However, the St. Marie court indicated that a different decision might have
resulted had the co-borrowers been two individuals with conflicting in-
terests rather than a "family unit." 30 The In re Wilson"' court, in dis-
allowing joint recoveries' to spouses, mentioned only the "family unit"
rationale as a basis for its decision.82
A contrary view was espoused by Rivers v. Southern Discount Co.,3 5
which allowed two plaintiffs (again, a husband and wife) to secure sepa-
rate judgments against a creditor for a single disclosure violation.3 4
Rivers held that despite the limited disclosure requirement of section
23. Id. at 116. One of the plaintiff's arguments which the Barksdale court re-
jected was that the repayment schedule' and the default charge provisions were so
logically related that they should be presented in close proximity on the disclosure
statement. Id.
24. Id. at 115-16, citing [1974] 5 CONS. CRaD. GuIDE (CCH) ff 31,102, at 66,489.
For a discussion of the 1974 public position letter, see text accompanying notes 18 &
19 supra.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (Supp. V 1975).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1631(a) (Supp. V 1975). For the pertinent text of this sub-
section, see note 14 supra.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1631(b) (Supp. V 1975). For the pertinent text of this sub-
section, see note 7 supra.
28. 376 F. Supp. 996 (E.D. La. 1974).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 997.
31. 411 F. Supp. 751 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
32. Id. at 753, citing St. Marie v. Southland Homes, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 996, 997
(E.D. La. 1974). See also Mason v. General Fin. Corp., 542 F.2d 1226, 1235 (4th
Cir. 1976) (since only one disclosure was required, husband and wife could recover
only one civil penalty); Powers v. Sims & Levin, 542 F.2d 1216, 1219-20 (4th Cir.
1976) (even in the case of a right of rescission, which requires disclosure to all
obligors, husband and wife were limited to one recovery).
33. 5 CONS. CRED. GuIDE (CCH) ff 98,796, at 88,447 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 1973).
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121(b), the creditor could not avoid liability to an obligor who had pro-
vided the creditor with added security. 5
In analyzing the meaningful sequence issue, the Allen court first
examined the Act and its legislative history to determine whether it was
within the Board's authority to require,86 in addition to the Act's mandate
of clear and conspicuous disclosure, that credit terms be arranged in mean-
ingful sequence. 87 Since the Act's objective was to provide the consumer
with adequate and meaningful credit disclosure, 8s and since Regulation Z
was issued to clarify the Act in any manner consistent with the intent
of Congress, 9 the court concluded that the Board's addition of the mean-
ingful sequence requirement was justified.4 0
Next, the court addressed the issue of what the meaningful sequence
provision specifically required with respect to the creditor's disclosure
statement. Relying upon the Board's public position letters41 and the
Garza decision,42 the Seventh Circuit determined that the term meaningful
sequence involves two requirements: 1) that logically related terms be
grouped together, and 2) that these groupings be arranged in a "logically
sequential order emphasizing the most important terms."48 While acknowl-
edging that the meaningful sequence requirement does not compel a specific
format, the court emphasized that the arrangement chosen must adequately
reflect the essential purpose of the Act - "clarity of disclosure. '44
Turning to a detailed examination of Beneficial's disclosure state-
ment, the Allen court concluded that it failed to present the credit terms in
meaningful sequence.45 First, the court found that the credit terms were
not arranged in logical groupings as required by the first element of the
meaningful sequence standard.46 The court pointed out that the terms
comprising the amount financed were "scattered across the top half of the
35. Id.; accord, Mirabal v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 537 F.2d 871, 881-83
(7th Cir. 1976) (opinion written by same judge who authored Allen).
36. See 15 U.S.C. § 1631(a) (Supp. V 1975). For the pertinent text of this
section, see note 14 supra.
37. 531 F.2d at 800-01.
38. 531 F.2d at 800-01, citing 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. V 1975) ; see text accom-
panying note 11 supra.
39. 531 F.2d at 800-01, citing 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970).
40. 531 F.2d at 800-01.
41. For a discussion of these public position letters, see notes 16-19 and accom-
panying text supra.
42. For a discussion of the Garza holding, see notes 20 & 21 and accompanying
text supra.
43. 531 F.2d at 801. The Allen court expressed the view that if the creditor were
sincerely interested in providing the consumer with adequate credit information, these
requirements would not be considered burdensome. Id.
44. Id. at 802, citing [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH)
30,759, at 66,333.
45. 531 F.2d at 802. The Seventh Circuit noted that the lower court had found
10 examples of meaningful sequence violations on Beneficial's form, and it expanded
this list with further illustrations of the defendant's noncompliance. Id., citing Allen
v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 393 F. Supp. 1382, 1384-85 (N.D. Ind. 1975).
46. 531 F.2d at 802; see text accompanying note 43 supra.
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statement" and interspersed with terms which were not "principal elements
of the amount financed. '47 Conversely, other terms which were arithmeti-
cally unconnected were grouped together.48  In addition, the court found
that Beneficial's form did not satisfy the second element of the meaningful
sequence requirement - that disclosure items be arranged in a logical
order emphasizing the most important terms.49 The court opined that for
optimum clarity the elements comprising the amount financed should be
listed in a summation order with principal terms, such as the amount
disbursed to the borrowers, placed at the top.50 The court stated that since
the disclosure statement was created to aid the borrower, it must provide
a "conceptual framework a borrower can easily comprehend." 51
In finding that the disclosure statement did not comply with the mean-
ingful sequence requirement, the court rejected Beneficial's contention
that the layout of the statement was logical in that it had employed a
subtractional52 rather than a summation formula in the arrangement of the
credit terms.58 The Allen court characterized the subtractional method
as insufficient "to convey an understanding of the transaction" since
"[p] eople do not normally conceive of a loan from a subtractional point of
view.",54
Having disposed of the meaningful sequence issue, the Seventh Cir-
cuit addressed the question of whether the defendant was liable to Mrs.
Allen despite the fact that as a co-borrower she was not required to receive
a copy of the disclosure statement.5 5  Initially, the court found that the
plaintiff was clearly entitled to disclosure under section 121 (a) of the
Act as a "person to whom consumer credit [was] extended. 15 6 Examining
47. 531 F.2d at 802.
48. Id. at 803. In the court's view, the only logically related group of terms were
elements of the prior loan. Id. However, since these terms stood out clearly in con-
trast to the rest of the statement, the court reasoned that a customer might easily
mistake them for elements of the present loan. Id.
49. Id. see text accompanying note 43 supra.
50. Id. at 801.
51. Id. at 803-04.
52. This subtractional order began with the total amount of payments and ended
with the amount disbursed. Id. at 804.
53. Id. at 804. In a summation order, as explained by the Allen court, "the terms
making up the sum are placed in a column with the principal terms of the sum at the
topand with the total at the bottom." Id. at 801.
54. Id. Beneficial also argued that its format was designed to conform to a
national computer system to which it subscribed. Id. at 804. The court found no
merit in this argument and stated that either the program could be altered or the
computer output could be transferred by hand to a proper disclosure form. Id.
Besides taking exception to the theory behind the subtractional method,
the Allen court found fault with Beneficial's use of that method. The court pointed
out that the elements were not placed in a purely subtractional order, since many
terms were included in the series but were not subtracted. Id. at 804 n.5.
55. Id. at 805; see text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
56. Id. at 805; citing 15 U.S.C. § 1631(a) (Supp. V 1975). For the pertinent
text of section 121 (a), see note 14 supra.
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Beneficial's argument that section 121 (b), which provides that only one
disclosure statement need be provided to joint obligors, limits a creditor's
liability under section 121 (a), 57 the court concluded, on the basis of the
language and legislative history of section 121, that Congress did not
intend to restrict the scope of subsection (a) and that subsection (b) was
added "merely to facilitate compliance with the Act" by reducing the
"burden of paperwork on the creditor." 58
The court proposed first that Congress could have intended the
creditor to disclose the required information to all obligors, although only
one individual actually would receive a copy of the statement. 9 Alterna-
tively, the court observed that even if only one obligor were to receive the
disclosure information, Congress may have assumed that proper disclosure
would protect all obligors, since the person receiving the information "would
certainly take the best credit terms available."6 0 Improper disclosure, the
Allen court concluded, would harm all obligors, not merely the person
who received the disclosure form.6'
The Allen court's formulation of the twofold meaningful sequence
standard6 2 leaves at least two unanswered questions concerning its appli-
cation. First, it is unclear whether Allen intended that this meaningful
sequence test be applied to both arithmetic and non-arithmetic terms. Since
the court concentrated its criticism of the defendant's disclosure statement
on the arrangement of arithmetic terms,6 it is arguable that the Seventh
Circuit would agree with the Barksdale4 conclusion that the relative place-
ment of informational or descriptive items need not conform to the mean-
ingful sequence requirement. 65 However, it might be argued that in order
to provide the consumer with the most comprehensible statement possible,
the Allen meaningful sequence test should apply to non-arithmetic terms
as well.66
57. 531 F.2d at 805. For the pertinent text of section 121(b), see note 7 supra.
58. 531 F.2d at 806. For guidance, the court reviewed the House Report which
accompanied the Act. Id., citing H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 27,
reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1962, 1984 The section of this
report which refers indirectly to section 121(b) of the Act provides in pertinent
part: "In order to reduce needless paperwork, disclosure need only be made to one
obligor. For example, if two people (e.g. a husband and wife) are the obligors, only
one copy of the contract with the required disclosure information would need to be
furnished." Id.
59. 531 F.2d at 805.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 805-06.
62. For a discussion of the Allen court's meaningful sequence test, see text
accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
63. The Allen court did criticize the placement of one non-arithmetic term -
the security interest description; however, the reason was not its placement relative
to the other terms but the fact that the description had been split in half and printed
in separate, unconnected sections of the form. 531 F.2d at 803.
64. For a discussion of the Barksdale decision, see text accompanying notes
22-24 supra.
65. 393 F. Supp. at 116-17.
66. While Barksdale cited the 1974 Board letter as support for its theory (see notes
18-19 & 24 and accompanying text supra), a recent letter issued by the Board could
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The second unanswered question involves the Seventh Circuit's criti-
cism of the subtractional method of listing disclosure items.67 It is sub-
mitted that the Allen court's firm objection to the subtractional method
and its strong endorsement of the summation method unnecessarily limits
the flexibility of the meaningful sequence test. This position seems rather
arbitrary and is inconsistent with the court's statement that no singular
arrangement of terms was mandatory.68 In addition, a recent Board public
position letter opposes the proposition that all disclosure items must be
presented in a summation column and characterizes such a requirement
as unreasonably rigid.69
In view of the Act's purpose of protecting the consumer against unfair
credit practices, the Allen court's decision to allow recovery to joint obligors
appears sound. Of the court's two arguments in support of its position
be referred to in defense of the contrary view. See [1976] 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE
(CCH) % 31,387, at 66,646. This letter stated:
"[M]eaningful sequence" cannot - and should not - be defined by reference
to some rigid concept of arithmetical progression. Since a primary purpose of
this requirement and of the . . . Act as a whole is to adequately inform con-
sumers of the terms and costs of credit, we believe that § 226.6(a) requires that
related terms be presented in an order which will assist the customer in under-
standing their relationship.
Id. at 66,647. The Board's latest statement, therefore, suggests a retreat from its
former position, which concentrated upon the presentation of only arithmetically
related terms.
A more basic question might be whether the sheer volume of non-arithmetic
information which the Act and Regulation Z require actually adds to the confusion
of the consumer, no matter how "meaningfully" it is presented. In testimony before
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Jonathan Landers
stated that "[f]rom the consumer's point of view the typical truth-in-lending state-
ment is virtually inscrutable." Hearings on the Consumer Protection Efforts of
the Three Major Bank Regulatory Agencies Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Currency, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1976) (Statement of Jonathan
Landers) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. Landers credited this confusion
to a shift in emphasis from basic credit cost disclosure to complicated and tech-
nical credit term disclosure. Id. at 120. According to Landers, "people tend to re-
spond to too much disclosure not by selectively trying to pick out those terms
which are most important, but by being so overwhelmed by the disclosure as to totally
ignore them." Id. at 124.
67. For a discussion of the court's position, see notes 52-54 and accompanying
text supra.
68. 531 F.2d at 802, citing [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CONS. CRmE. GumE
(CCH) 1 30,759.
69. [1976] 5 CONS. CRED. GumE (CCH) f 31, 387, at 66,646. The Board stated:
"In order to comply with the requirements of [certain Regulation Z sections], most
disclosure statements would necessarily involve both additions and subtractions of
various items." Id. For a further discussion of the implications of this Board letter,
see note 66 supra.
One critic has claimed that the Allen court's rejection of the subtractional
method "is a clear example of middle-class bias in the courts." Kaufman, Bringing
Chaos Out of Order: Truth in Lending in the Courts, 10 GA. L. REv. 937, 949 n.47
(1976). This commentator suggested that in shopping for credit, the poor borrower
"works backward from the amount of monthly payment he can afford . . . to the
maximum amount of credit . . . which that monthly payment will produce - essen-
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that Congress did not intend to qualify the disclosure requirement of
section 12 1(a) by its limitation on the number of disclosure statements
required, the second is more persuasive.70 While Congress may not have
intended the Act to require creditors to disclose the credit terms to all
obligors regardless of the number of statements provided, it is probable
that Congress assumed that proper disclosure to one obligor was adequate
protection for all. Section 121 (b), which the House described as a measure
"to reduce needless paperwork," 7 ' should not be permitted to stifle the
effectiveness of the Act's disclosure requirements by preventing injured
borrowers from recovering.
It should be noted that the Seventh Circuit's holding that each obligor
may sue the creditor for disclosure violations raises two problems which
were not addressed in Allen. First, the court's ruling could increase the
number of potential plaintiffs, resulting in additional litigation which would
impose further costs and burdens upon the courts. It is arguable, however,
that this problem is counterbalanced by the positive contribution the instant
decision makes toward the achievement of the Act's goal of protecting con-
sumers.7 2 Second, and more importantly, the decision subjects the creditor
to multiple liabilities on each credit transaction involving more than one
obligor. Interestingly, in reaching its determination, the Allen court did
not mention the decisions which refused to grant multiple recoveries .7
Nevertheless, since the rationale of the single-recovery decisions appears to
rest not upon statutory construction, but upon the courts' view of the legal
status of husband and wife, 74 perhaps the Allen court did not consider these
cases applicable to the instant facts.
Whether Congress intended the creditor to be penalized more than
once for a single violation of the Act is not altogether clear. The civil liability
section of the Act 75 provides for both actual and statutory damages. In its
70. See 531 F.2d at 805-06; text accompanying notes 59-61 supra.
71. H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1962. For the pertinent text of the Report, see note 58 supra.
72. See text accompanying note 11 supra. In Thomas v. Myers-Dickson Furniture
Co., 479 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1973), the court stated that the Act's goal was to create
"a system of 'private attorney generals'" and that the civil liability section was "in-
tended to allow aggrieved consumers to participate in policing the Act." Id. at 748.
It would be inconsistent with this objective to restrict the number of consumers who
are given access to the courts.
73. For a discussion of these opposing decisions, see notes 28-32 and accompanying
text supra. The Seventh Circuit did criticize the St. Marie position in a case subse-
quent to Allen. See Mirabal v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 537 F.2d 871, 882
(7th Cir. 1976).
74. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
75. The civil liability section of the Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, any creditor who fails to
comply with any requirement imposed under this part ...with respect to any
person is liable to such person in an amount equal to the sum of-
(1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of the
failure ;
(2) (A) in the case of an individual action twice the amount of any
finance charge in connection with the transaction ... except that the liability
1976-1977]
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discussion of the statutory damages, the House Report interpreted the Act
as imposing "a maximum penalty not to exceed $1,000 on any individual
transaction."76 This statement suggests an overall recovery limit of $1,000
per transaction and not per obligor. However, two policy reasons support the
Allen court's holding that multiple recoveries are allowable. First, effective
civil enforcement of the Act requires that consumers not be frustrated in
their attempt to recover against a noncomplying creditor. 77 Furthermore,
multiple recoveries are not unjustifiable in view of the fact that the Act's
terms do not impose onerous standards upon creditors.78
In conclusion, the Allen decision is significant both in its attempt
to articulate a meaningful sequence standard and in its handling of the
multiple recovery question. The meaningful sequence test no doubt will
be useful to future courts in evaluating creditors' compliance with Regula-
tion Z. However, the question of multiple recoveries is likely to remain
a controversial one. Since the Supreme Court has denied certiorari to the
defendant in this case, 79 Allen will stand, at least for the present, as an
influential rule of law in the Seventh Circuit and beyond.
Mary Lynn Bingham
under this subparagraph shall not be less than $100 nor greater than $1,000;
[and]
(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing lia-
bility, the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as
determined by the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1640 (Supp. V 1975) (amended 1976).
76. H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1976 (emphasis added).
77. In Buford v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Ga. 1971), the
court noted that "[t]he Truth in Lending Act clearly contemplates substantial enforce-
ment through individual consumers." Id. at 1248. For a further discussion of the
civil liability section of the Act, see Comment, Truth in Lending and the Statute of
Limitations, 21 VILL. L. REV. 904, 926-27 n.131 (1975-76).
78. In Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973), the
United States Supreme Court determined that "[t]he burdens imposed on creditors
[by the Act] are not severe, when measured against the evils which are avoided."
Id. at 371. Some commentators, however, have argued that the Act imposes a heavy
burden upon the creditor and that "it has become virtually impossible [for the creditor]
to formulate and devise a statement that is in full compliance, no if's, and's, or but's."
Senate Hearings, supra note 66, at 119. See also, B. CLARK & J. FONSECA, supra
note 11, § 43, at 90-91 (Supp. 1976).
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FEDERAL ESTATE TAXATION - SECTION 2056 MARITAL DEDUC-
TION - EQUALIZATION CLAUSE - MARITAL TRUST, THE CONTENT
OF WHICH Is DETERMINED UNDER A FORMULA DESIGNED TO
EQUALIZE THE VALUE OF THE DECEDENT'S AND THE SURVIVING
SPOUSE'S ESTATES, QUALIFIES FOR THE MARITAL DEDUCTION.
Estate of Charles W. Smith (Tax Ct. 1976)
Charles W. Smith (decedent) died on June 7, 1970.' Pursuant to
the provisions of an inter vivos trust agreement executed by the decedent,
the trust assets, comprising most of his gross estate for federal estate tax
purposes, 2 were divided into a marital and a residual portion upon the
decedent's death.8 The residual portion first received those assets which,
had they passed to the decedent's wife, would not have qualified for the
marital deduction under section 2056 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 (Code). 4 Under an equalization formula clause in the trust agree-
ment, the marital portion then received a percentage interest of the balance
of the assets equal to one-half of the amount by which the value of the
decedent's adjusted gross estate exceeded the value of what the surviving
spouse's adjusted gross estate5 would have been had she survived her
1. Estate of Charles W. Smith, 66 T.C. 415 (1976), appeal docketed, No.
(7th Cir. Jan. 21, 1977).
2. 66 T.C. at 416. The inter vivos trust agreement between the decedent and
the Northern Trust Company of Chicago, Illinois, was dated August 2, 1967. The
trust was revocable, with the income payable to the decedent for life. Id. Because
the trust was established within three years of the decedent's death, because he had
reserved an interest in the trust assets, and because the trust was revocable, the
trust assets constituted part of the decedent's gross estate. See I.R.C. §§ 2035,
2036(a) (1), 2038(a) (1).
3. 66 T.C. at 417. For the full text of the trust provisions at issue in this case,
see id. at 417-19.
4. Id. at 417. The trust instrument provided in pertinent part: "There shall
first be allocated to the Residual Portion any assets or the proceeds of any asset (or
interest therein) with respect to which the marital deduction would not be allowed
if allocated to the Marital Portion." Id.
Section 2056 of the Code allows the decedent's estate to deduct the value of
the property passing to the surviving spouse, subject to certain limitations. I.R.C.
§ 2056(a). One limitation is that certain terminable interests so passed do not qualify
for the marital deduction. Id. § 2056(b) (1). A terminable interest is one which could
terminate with the lapse of time or upon the occurrence or failure of a condition, thus
escaping taxation in the estate of the surviving spouse. Id.
5. 66 T.C. at 418. The trust instrument further provided:
There shall then be allocated to the Marital Portion that percentage interest
in the balance of the assets constitutifig the trust estate which shall when taken
together with all other interests and property that qualify for the marital deduc-
tion and that pass or shall have passed to the Settlor's said wife under other pro-
visions of this trust or otherwise, obtain for Settlor's estate a marital deduction
which would result in the lowest Federal estate taxes in Settlor's estate and
Settlor's wife's estate, on the assumption Settlor's wife died after him, but on the
date of his death and that her estate were valued as of the date on (and in the
manner in) which Settlor's estate is valued for Federal estate tax purposes;
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husband but died on the same day that he died. The surviving spouse's
estate was deemed to include her own assets existing at the date of the
decedent's death, valued as of the date on (and in the manner in) which
the decedent's estate was valued for federal estate tax purposes.6 Finally,
the remaining percentage of trust assets was allocated to the residual por-
tion.7
The marital portion was administered as a trust (marital trust) with
Smith's wife receiving a life estate in the net income therefrom and a
general power of appointment by will over the marital trust corpus.8
Despite section 2056(b) (5) of the Code, which specifies that life estates
coupled with general powers of appointment exercisable in favor of the
surviving spouse or the surviving spouse's estate will qualify for the
marital deduction,9 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner)
Settlor's purpose is to equalize, insofar as possible, his estate and her estate for
Federal estate tax purposes, based upon said assumptions.
Id. (emphasis added).
The objective of the equalization clause was the minimization of the total
federal estate taxes payable on both the estate of the decedent and the hypothetical
estate of his surviving spouse. Because of the progressive estate tax rates, the sum
of the federal estate taxes will be minimized when the two taxable estates are equal
in value. See I.R.C. § 2001.
6. See note 5 supra. The trust instrument also provided:
In selecting a valuation date for the purpose of the Federal estate tax, Settlor
directs Trustee to select the date which will result in the greatest tax benefit to
Settlor's wife's and Settlor's estates, regardless of the effect this selection may
have on the amount provided by this Article for Settlor's wife.
66 T.C. at 418.
At the time decedent died, section 2032 of the Code allowed the valuation of
an estate to be determined at any time within one year of the decedent's death. See
I.R.C. § 2032. Therefore, the trustee could not have determined the extent of the
interest which would pass to the marital portion until after one year from the date
of death. 66 T.C. at 420.
Although the percentage shares of the marital and residual portions were
computed on the basis of estate tax values, the actual amount of the trust assets to
be distributed to each portion of the trust was determined by applying these per-
centage shares "to the assets distributed valued at their fair market value at the time
of distribution." Id. at 418.
7. 66 T.C. at 418. The trust instrument provided that all taxes and other ex-
penses were to be charged against the residual portion. Id. at 419.
8. Id. at 418. She also received a nongeneral power of appointment exercisable
inter vivos. Id.
9. I.R.C. § 2056(b) (5). Section 2056(b) (5) of the Code provides in relevant
part:
In the case of an interest in property passing from the decedent, if his sur-
viving spouse is entitled for life to all the income from the entire interest, or all
the income from a specific portion thereof, payable annually or at more frequent
intervals, with power in the surviving spouse to appoint the entire interest, or
such specific portion (exercisable in favor of such surviving spouse, or of the
estate of such surviving spouse, or in favor of either, whether or not in each case
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disallowed a marital deduction for the interest passing to the surviving
spouse under the marital trust.10 He argued that under the equalization
clause formula it was possible that an increase in the value of the assets
in the spouse's estate during the alternate valuation period could prevent
any transfer of assets to the marital trust." Thus, he concluded that the
marital trust was a nondeductible terminable interest within the meaning
of section 2056(b) (1) of the Code.' 2  The United States Tax Court
rejected the Commissioner's view, holding that the equalization clause did
not create a nondeductible terminable interest within the meaning of sec-
tion 2056(b) (1) of the Code, in that the assets passing to the marital
trust qualified for the marital deduction under section 2056(b) (5). Estate
person to appoint any part of the interest, or such specific portion, to any person
other than the surviving spouse-
(A) the interest or such portion thereof so passing shall, for purposes of
subsection (a), be considered as passing to the surviving spouse, and
(B) no part of the interest so passing shall, for purposes of paragraph
(1) (A), be considered as passing to any person other than the surviving
spouse.
Id.
10. 66 T.C. at 421.
11. Id. at 427.
12. Id. at 421, citing I.R.C. § 2056(b) (1). Section 2056(b) (1) of the Code
provides:
Where, on the lapse of time, on the occurrence of an event of contingency,
or on the failure of an event or contingency to occur, an interest passing to the
surviving spouse will terminate or fail, no deduction shall be allowed under this
section with respect to such interest-
(A) if an interest in such property passes or has passed (for less than
an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth) from the
decedent to any person other than such surviving spouse (or the estate of such
spouse) ; and
(B) if by reason of such passing such person (or his heirs or assigns)
may possess or enjoy any part of such property after such termination or
failure of the interest so passing to the surviving spouse;
and no deduction shall be allowed with respect to such interest (even if such
deduction is not disallowed under subparagraphs (A) and (B))-
(C) if such interest is to be acquired for the surviving spouse, pursuant
to directions of the decedent, by his executor or by the trustee of a trust.
For purposes of this paragraph, an interest shall not be considered as an interest
which will terminate or fail merely because it is the ownership of a bond, note, or
similar contractual obligation, the discharge of which would not have the effect
of an annuity for life or for a term.
Id.
In construing the language of section 2056(b) (1) that "an interest passing
to the surviving spouse will terminate or fail," id. (emphasis added), the courts, in
accord with the legislative history of the deduction, have interpreted the term "will"
as if it read "may." See, e.g., Estate of Virginia L. Ray, 54 T.C. 1170 (1970). In
other words, there is no requirement that the interest must terminate; it is sufficient
that it is terminable. See S. REP. No. 1013, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 15-16,
reprinted in [1948] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1229, 1237-38.
If the interest in the instant case could have terminated before the wife's
death, then the marital trust would have also failed to satisfy section 2056(b)(5)'s
requirement that the surviving spouse be entitled to all the income from the trust for
life. For the text of section 2056(b) (5), see note 9 supra.
1976-19771
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of Charles W. Smith, 66 T.C. 415 (1976), appeal docketed, No
(7th Cir. Jan. 21, 1977).
The marital deduction was originally enacted in 19481 as part 14 of
an effort to equalize the estate tax treatment of estates in community
property and common law states.15 This provision, as it existed for
decedents dying before 1977, allowed the estate to deduct the value of the
property passed to the surviving spouse, 16 up to a maximum of one-half
of the value of the decedent's adjusted gross estate.' 7 The availability of
the deduction, however, is limited by the terminable interest rule, which
provides as follows: if the interest received by the spouse could terminate
with the lapse of time or upon the occurrence or nonoccurrence of some
contingency and one of the four exceptions to the rule is not met,18 it
13. See Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 361, 62 Stat. 117 (now I.R.C. § 2056).
14. See also I.R.C. §§ 1 (a), 2523, 6013.
15. S. REP. No. 1013, pt. 1, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1948] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1163. In the common law states, the entire value of property owned
by the decedent or owned jointly with the surviving spouse is included in full in the
decedent's gross estate, except to the extent that part of the consideration for thejointly held property was provided by the surviving spouse. I.R.C. §§ 2033, 2040.
However, in community property states, only one-half of the property acquired during
the marriage is included in the decedent's gross estate. See id. § 2033. Equalization
occurs through the operation of section 2056(c), which limits the deduction to one-
half of the adjusted gross estate, a defined term that excludes all community property.
See id. § 2056(c).
16. I.R.C. § 2056(a). The property must qualify for the marital deduction by
not violating the requirements of the terminable interest rule of section 2056(b)(1)
of the Code or by complying with the requirements of one of the exceptions to the
terminable interest rule. For the exceptions to the terminable interest rule, see note 18
infra. For the text of section 2056(b)(1), see note 12 supra. Otherwise, property
could be passed to the surviving spouse which would be taxed in neither the decedent's
nor the surviving spouse's estate.
17. I.R.C. § 2056(c) (1) (1954). For decedents dying before 1977, a bequest of
probate assets equal to less than 50% of the decedent's adjusted gross estate resulted
in a partial loss of a tax deduction, assuming that no assets in the decedent's gross
estate that were not in the probate estate and that had passed to the surviving spouse
qualified for the marital deduction. A bequest of more than 50% could result in the
excess being taxed both in the estate of the decedent and the estate of the surviving
spouse. Thus, a formula clause designed to pinpoint the marital deduction at the 50%
level is frequently included in a will or trust instrument. See generally id. § 2056; 39
TENN. L. REV. 89, 97 (1971). For the treatment of decedents dying after 1976. see
I.R.C. § 2056(c) (1).
18. For the four exceptions to the terminable interest rule, see I.R.C. § 2056-
(b) (1) (B), (3), (5), (6). If the terminable interest rule would apply solely because
1) the interest is conditioned upon the survival of the spouse for a period not exceed-
ing six months or upon the survival of the spouse of a common disaster, or both,
2) the interest is an income interest for the surviving spouse's life payable no less
frequently than annually, or 3) 'the interest is a right to income from life insurance
or annuity payments, the marital deduction will be allowed so long as the spouse does
in fact survive for six months or from the common disaster, or with respect to the
latter two occurrences, as long as the spouse has a general power of appointment
exercisable in favor of the surviving spouse or the surviving spouse's estate. Also the
terminable interest rule will not apply if no other person has an interest in the
property subsequent to that of the surviving spouse. Id.; see id. § 2041.
Cases which have interpreted section 2056(b) include: Estate of Cunha v.
Commissioner, 279 F.2d 292 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 942 (1960); Quivey
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will not qualify for the marital deduction. 19 The terminable interest rule
and the four statutory exceptions to it have been the focus of much of
the judicial interpretation of the marital deduction, as exemplified by the
lengthy controversy over the deductibility of widow's support allowances.2 0
Widow's support allowances 21 provided the occasion for the major
Supreme Court case interpreting section 2056. The Supreme Court in
Jackson v. United States22 held that a California widow's statutory right
to support did not qualify for the marital deduction 23 since qualification
for the marital deduction must be determined as of the decedent's death,2 4
and a surviving spouse in California "did not have an indefeasible interest"25
as of that date. Under California law, a surviving spouse is entitled to sup-
port for two years following the death of the decedent unless the spouse
dies or remarries prior to an order for relief, in which case all rights to
support (accrued or otherwise) cease; if death or remarriage occurs after
the court order, the spouse's right to all nonaccrued payments ceases. 26
That the spouse did not die or remarry within the two year period was
considered irrelevant by the Court,27 as was the fact that the monies paid
to the spouse would be taxed again in her estate, if not consumed. The
Supreme Court stated: "[T]he determinative factor is not taxability to
the surviving spouse but terminability as defined by the statute."28 The
v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 433 (D. Neb. 1959), rezd, 292 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1961);
Estate of Margaret R. Gale, 35 T.C. 215 (1960).
19. I.R.C. § 2056(b) (1); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056 (b)-l (b) (1958). For the text
of section 2056(b) (1), see note 12 supra.
20. See note 28 infra.
21. A support allowance is a state statutory right of the surviving spouse to sup-
port payments from the decedent's estate while the estate is being administered. See,
e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1002 (1975).
22. 376 U.S. 503 (1964).
23. Id. at 507.
24. Id. The Court commented that "judging deductibility as of the date of the
Probate Court's order ignores the Senate Committee's admonition that in considering
terminability of an interest for purposes of a marital deduction 'the situation is viewed
as at the date of the decedent's death.'" Id. at 508, quoting S. REP. No. 1013, pt. 2,
80th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in [1948] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1232.
See also Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503, 510 & n.10. For other types of
interests in which date of death is considered the proper time for a determination of
value, see id. at 508 n.6.
25. 376 U.S. at 507.
26. Id. at 507-08; see CAL. PROB. CODE § 680 (West 1956).
27. 376 U.S. at 507. The Supreme Court emphasized that the situation must be
viewed as of the date of the decedent's death and not as of the probate court's order:
[I]t is difficult to accept an approach which would allow a deduction of $42,000
on the facts of this case, a deduction of $72,000 if the order had been entered
at the end of two years from Mr. Richard's death and none at all if the order had
been entered immediately upon his death.
Id. at 507-08.
28. Id. at 510. See also S. REP. No. 1013, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 11, 15,
reprinted in [1948] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1232-33, 1237.
The Supreme Court in Jackson did not decide whether the fact that a support
allowance required the obtaining of a court order would alone make any such allow-
ance a terminable interest. Prior to the Jackson decision, lower courts had wrestled
extensively with the issue. The Commissioner contended in every case that support
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reasoning of Jackson has not been overturned by subsequent cases, 29 and
in fact, was utilized by the Smith court in reaching its decision.
Prior to Smith, no court had been presented with the exact issue 0
of whether a formula clause bequest to a surviving spouse is a terminable
interest if the value of the bequest is dependent upon the hypothetical
value of the spouse's adjusted gross estate, a factor which is extrinsic
to the decedent's estate and not determinable as of the date of the dece-
awards were nondeductible interests if they had to be enforced by court orders or
would fail upon the death or remarriage of the surviving spouse. Some courts found
such awards to be deductible on the ground that a support allowance could be paid
only to the surviving spouse; thus, no interest could pass to someone else as required
by section 2056(b)(1)(A) in order for the terminable interest to become nondeduc-
tible. See, e.g., Quivey v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 433 (D. Neb. 1959), rev'd,
292 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1961). Other courts held that since the right to support vested
as of the date of the decedent's death, the allowance qualified for the marital deduction
even though the surviving spouse had to petition the appropriate probate court in
order to receive it. See United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 297 F.2d 312
(5th Cir. 1962); Estate of Michael G. Rudnick, 36 T.C. 1021 (1961); Estate of
Margaret R. Gale, 35 T.C. 215 (1960); Estate of Proctor D. Rensenhouse, 31 T.C.
818 (1959). Still other courts supported the Commissioner, taking the view that even
if the right to support vested under the applicable state law, it would not qualify for
the marital deduction, since failure to apply to the probate court would divest the
surviving spouse of the right to support. See Quivey v. United States, 292 F.2d 252
(8th Cir. 1961); Estate of Cunha v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 292 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 942 (1960).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Edmondson, 331 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1964) (per
curiam); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v United States, 234 F. Supp. 897 (M.D.N.C.
1964) ; Estate of Ludwig Neugass, 65 T.C. 188 (1975).
30. The court's statement that Smith was the first time that the Commissioner
had challenged a formula clause, 66 T.C. at 425 & n.16, was inaccurate. See REv.
PROc. 64-19, 1964-1 C.B. 682. But Smith may well be the first case in which a frac-
tional formula bequest was challenged.
In the past there have generally been two types of formula bequests designed
to insure that the amount passed to the surviving spouse equaled the amount of the
maximum marital deduction. See Friedman & Wheeler, Marital Deduction Formula
Clauses, 106 EST. & TR. 799 (1967). The first involved a pecuniary bequest of one-
half of the adjusted gross estate as valued for estate tax purposes. In other words,
the surviving spouse would be vested with a right to a sum certain. A hybrid of this
type of bequest, subsequently disallowed except in two limited situations, directed
the executor to distribute the assets in kind or in cash and to choose the assets to be
distributed. This type of formula bequest allowed a bit of post mortem planning
because certain assets would depreciate or appreciate within the alternate valuation
period. Although the estate tax values controlled the amounts to be distributed, by
accepting depreciated assets, a surviving spouse could make a tax-free transfer to the
other beneficiaries without reducing the decedent's estate tax marital deduction. A
later revenue procedure disallowed this hybrid formula by requiring that the power of
the executor be strictly limited to one of two alternatives: either the date-of-distribu-
tion values of the assets passed to the surviving spouse must equal the marital
deduction, or the spouse must share pro rata in any value changes. REV. PROC. 64-19,
1964-1 C.B. 682.
The second type of formula was a fractional bequest, by which the decedent
devised to his surviving spouse a specified fraction of all the assets as valued at the
time of distribution. This type was specifically exempted from Revenue Procedure
64-19 by section 4 thereof. See id. § 4.
For a detailed discussion of formula clauses, see R. CovEY, Tim MARITAL
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dent's death.81 The Smith court disagreed with the Commissioner's view
that since the actual amount to be transferred to the marital trust could
be based upon events occurring after the decedent's death, the interest was
a nondeductible terminable interest.82 Rather, the court observed that the
actual value of Mrs. Smith's interest was immaterial since the interest
would be determined upon the basis of a fixed formula mandated by the
trust instrument.8 In the court's view, Mrs. Smith had an indefeasibly
vested interest in whatever transfer of assets the formula produced.84
If the formula resulted in no allocation to the marital trust, Mrs. Smith's
interest would be valued at zero,3 5 but such valuation would not mean
that her interest was terminable.8 6 Since the trustee had no discretion
as to the choice of valuation dates,87 and since no "subsequent events
which could occur .. .would change the basic ingredients of the for-
mula,"8 the court concluded that the surviving spouse had an interest in
the decedent's estate as of the date of death, and that the interest qualified
for the marital deduction under the principles implicit in Jacksdn.8 In
reasoning to this conclusion, the Smith court stressed that the surviving
spouse's interest would not escape taxation in the subsequent estate be-
cause of the general power of appointment that accompanied the life
estate, 40 and that Northeastern Pennsykania National Bank & Trust Co.
supra; Polasky, Marital Deduction Formula Clauses in Estate Planning - Estate and
Income Tax Considerations, 63 MicH. L. REV. 809 (1965) ; 39 TENN. L. REv. 89 (1971).
The equalization clause in Smith is probably best termed a fractional bequest.
See notes 5 & 6 supra. However, it is distinguishable from the normal fractional
bequest in that it relied upon an element not within the decedent's estate and not
determinable as of the date of the decedent's death: the value of the surviving spouse's
hypothetical estate.
31. See note 6 supra. No problem would have existed in this case if the valua-
tion of the wife's estate could have been determined only on the day of the decedent's
death. In that situation, the outside factor, except for what passed from the husband
to the wife on the husband's death, would have been determinable as of decedent's
death as required by Jackson. For a discussion of Jackson, see notes 22-29 and accom-
panying text supra. That the decedent's estate could utilize the alternate valuation
date for valuation purposes is unimportant since section 2032 of the Code specifically
authorizes this practice. See I.R.C. § 2032. The Commissioner apparently has con-
ceded that the variables created by sections 642(g) and 213(d) of the code raise no
problems with the Smith equalization formula. R. CoVEY, supra note 30, at 70 & n.145e
(1976 Supp.).
32. 66 T.C. at 427-28.
33. Id. at 430.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 429.
36. Id. In support of this view, the court cited Treasury Regulation section
20.2056(b)-4, which implicitly provides "that the use of the alternate valuation date
might affect the amount of the marital deduction." Id. at 428, citing Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2056(b)-4 (1958). It also relied upon Jackson for the premise that a terminable
interest existed if the surviving spouse did not have an interest in the estate on the
date of the decedent's death. 66 T.C. at 428-29, citing Jackson v. United States, 376
U.S. 503 (1964).
37. 66 T.C. at 428.
38. Id. at 430.
39. Id. at 429-30. For a discussion of Jackson, see notes 22-29 and accompanying
text supra.
40. 66 T.C. at 429.
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v. United States,41 the most recent Supreme Court case on the marital
deduction, had described the marital deduction as encompassing a liberal
estate-splitting policy.42
The court defined an interest indefeasibly vested as of the date
of the decedent's death as nonterminable. 43 In support of this, Jackson
was properly cited. However, the dissent maintained that the court erred
in defining the interest received by Mrs. Smith as one which was in-
defeasibly vested.44 Although her interest had vested upon the date of
the decedent's death, it had the potential of becoming an interest in nothing
since nothing would have been transferred to the marital trust if, upon
the chosen valuation date, the wife's hypothetical adjusted gross estate
equaled or exceeded that of the decedent. 45 Hers was not a vested interest
in, for example, stock certificates which, although received, might have
had a market value of zero. Rather, her interest in the decedent's estate
was such that, potentially, no transfer at all would be made to her under
the formula. 40  The dissent observed that an interest in nothing is no
interest at all, and a right although vested can still be defeasible.4
7
In its initial consideration of Jackson,48 and by its lack of discussion
as to why it found Mrs. Smith's vested interest to be indefeasible, the
Smith court seemingly implied that the Jackson test 49 is satisfied once it
is determined that there is a vested interest in the decedent's probate
estate. In order to satisfy the terminable interest rule, however, not only
must the interest be vested as of the date of the decedent's death, it must
41. 387 U.S. 213 (1967) (holding that the grant of the right to a specific dollar
amount of trust income qualified for the marital deduction under section 2056(b) (5)
despite Treasury Regulation section 20.56 (b)-5 (c)); see notes 56-58 and accompany-
ing text infra.
42. 66 T.C. at 430.
43. Id. at 428.
44. See id. at 433-34 (Irwin, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 433 (Irwin, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 434 (Irwin, J., dissenting) ; cf. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b), T.D. 6826,
1965-2 C.B. 367 (describing how an interest is to be valued).
47. 66 T.C. at 433 & n.2 (Irwin, J., dissenting).
The Smith opinion was internally inconsistent with respect to defining the per-
centage interests. It stated that if an interest "was contingent or conditioned on unknown
factors or events, that interest would have to be categorized as terminable." Id. at 432.
In support thereof the court stated that the surviving spouse "was indefeasibly vested
in an undefined percentage interest in each and every asset remaining in the trust
corpus after all nondeductible property interests were allocated to the residual portion."
Id. (emphasis added). It is unclear how an interest which is to be defined at some
future time can be indefeasibly vested before it is so defined.
If the bequest to Mrs, Smith had been an outright gift rather than in trust,
then the variableness of her percentage interest would make it a nondeductible
terminable interest. See R. Covy, supra note 30, at 108 (1976 Supp.). The fact that
Mrs. Smith was given a fixed interest in a trust which had a variable interest should
not make the bequest a deductible terminable interest. To hold otherwise would violate
the substance over form tenet of the Code. See generally Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-1 (f).
48. 66 T.C. at 428.
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be indefeasibly vested as of that date. 0 In failing to recognize this addi-
tional element, the Smith court did not adhere to the distinction which
is set forth in the Senate Report accompanying the enactment of the
marital deduction:
Subparagraph [(b)(1) of section 2056] is intended to be all
encompassing with respect to various kinds of contingencies and con-
ditions. Thus, it is immaterial whether the interest passing to the
surviving spouse is considered as a vested interest subject to divest-
ment or as a contingent interest. Subparagraph [(b)(1)] applies
whether the terms of the instrument or the theory of their application
are conceived as creating a future interest which may fail to ripen
or vest or as creating a present interest which may terminate .... 51
The court also overlooked the fact that, the marital deduction, being
a matter of statutory grace, should have been strictly construed.52 Con-
struing the marital deduction strictly would have required construing
liberally the terminable interest rule5" since that rule is a limitation upon
the allowance of the marital deduction. Therefore, the terminable interest
rule should have been interpreted as encompassing any type of contin-
gency.5 4 The possibility that an interest in nothing would have passed to
the surviving spouse because of the incorporation of the value of her
estate into the mechanics of the formula bequest should have made the
formula clause a contingency. 55 This conclusion is not altered by the
Smith court's attempt to buttress its holding by quoting Northeastern6
as follows:
[The congressional intent was] "to afford a liberal 'estate-splitting'
possibility to married couples, where the deductible half of the dece-
dent's estate would ultimately - if not consumed - be taxable in
the estate of the survivor * * *. Plainly such a provision should not
be construed so as to impose unwarranted restrictions upon the avail-
ability of the deduction. * * ,"57
50. See note 12 supra.
51. S. REP. No. 1013, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in [1948] U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1229.
52. Estate of Wycoff v. Commissioner, 506 F.2d 1144, 1149 (10th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975), citing Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S.
456 (1967) ; see McGehee v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Estate of
Pipe v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 814 (1957);
Stewart v. Usury, 273 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. La. 1967), aff'd, 399 F.2d 50 (5th Cir. 1968).
53. I.R.C. § 2056(b) (1); see note 12 supra.
54. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
55. However, if the surviving spouse's estate could be valued only on the date
of the decedent's death, the contingency would cease on that date and the Jackson test
would be satisfied. See note 31 supra. The Commissioner, at least in Smith, has
admitted that a formula involving only the value of the decedent's estate would not
violate the terminable interest rule regardless of whether its value is determined at the
date of death or within the alternate valuation period authorized in section 2032 of
the Code. See 66 T.C. at 431, 435.
56. 387 U.S. 213 (1967).
57. 66 T.C. at 430, quoting Northeastern Pennsylvania Nat'l Bank & Trust CO.
v. United States, 387 U.S. 213, 221 (1967).
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It is submitted that Northeastern is not applicable to the Smith situation.
Rather than interpreting the terminable interest rule, Northeastern dealt
with an element not at issue in the instant case - the "specific portion"
requirement of section 2056(b) (5) of the Code.58
Further, pragmatic difficulties attend the instant decision. First, no
guidance is provided with regard to the scope of the court's holding and
rationale. If the deduction is not disallowed here, courts in the future
may rely upon Smith in permitting other factors50 from outside of the
decedent's estate that are valued within the alternate valuation period to
be utilized within an equalization formula clause bequest.
Moreover, a second problem could arise if the degree of control
exercised by the surviving spouse over the outside factors was such that
a marital deduction might be artificially created. In the instant case the
wife had no control over the assets in her own estate during the alternate
valuation period because of the assumption that she died the same day as
her husband.60 Thus, her estate was limited to the assets she possessed on
the assumed date of death or those which would have been picked up
under the inclusion sections of the Code; 61 therefore, any disposition of
the assets by her during the alternate valuation period would have fixed
their value for purposes of valuing her estate on the alternate date.6 2
On the other hand, one could conceive of a clause wherein an assumption
as to when the surviving spouse died is made conditional upon which
valuation date is chosen - for example, a clause which assumes that
the wife died on the decedent's date of death if the date of death values
were chosen, but that she died six months after the decedent if the alter-
58. See Northeastern Pennsylvania Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States,
387 U.S. 213 (1967). Northeastern held that a bequest in trust providing for a monthly
stipened of a fixed dollar amount to be paid to the surviving spouse for life with a
power of appointment by will over the entire corpus met the "specific portion" re-
quirements of section 2056(b) (5) of the Code despite the contrary position taken by
the regulations to that section. 387 U.S. at 218; see Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(b),
(c) (1958). The Northeastern Court followed Gelb v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 544
(2d Cir. 1962), in stating that the determinative issue is whether the amount passing
to the surviving spouse could be computed as a specific sum. 387 U.S. at 224. The
Court calculated the deduction on the basis of the principal sum necessary to produce
the fixed monthly payments rather than calculating it as an actuarial present dis-
counted value as the Second Circuit had done in Gelb. Id. at 224-25.
59. Aside from statistically projected economic variables, one could, for example,
use the values of the estates of the other beneficiaries.
60. See note 5 supra. The court in Smith did not deal with the question of the
control of the outside factor which could be achieved by assumptions regarding the
composition of the surviving spouse's hypothetical estate which are different from
those used in Smith. Therefore, it is unlikely that the absence of such control formed
a basis for the court's holding. However, it is probably reasonable to assume that
Smith would not be followed if the trustee were given discretion to choose the
valuation dates.
61. See I.R.C. §§ 2031-44.
62. It was mandated that the wife's estate be valued in the same manner, as well
as on the same "date," as the decedent's estate. 66 T.C. at 418. Since the section 2032
alternate valuation period is not a fixed date per se, it is probable that the drafters of
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nate valuation period controlled for the decedent's valuation purposes. 63
By riotous living and gambling during the alternate valuation period, 64
the survivor could diminish her estate. A smaller value for the survivor's
estate would result in a greater bequest under the mandates of an equaliza-
tion clause, allowing a greater marital deduction. Such artificial manipula-
tion might be a consideration for future courts even though the effect
would be merely to increase artificially the deduction and to postpone the
payment of taxes. 5 The hypothesized situation would not violate the
sine qua non of estate tax, namely, that which is not taxed now must be
taxed later unless consumed in the interim. 6
Judicial interpretation of section 2056(b) of the Code has increased in
importance under the Tax Reform Act of 19767 because with the new
63. It is assumed here that the two estates would both be valued as of de-
cedent's date of death or within the decedent's alternate valuation period. This is the
same assumption as was used in Smith. See note 5 supra.
64. The gambling odds, be it at the roulette wheel or in the stock market, would
be increased in favor of the surviving spouse since, for each two dollars lost, one would
be recovered from the decedent's estate under the mandates of an equalization clause.
If stock were purchased and it decreased in value not only would the marital deduction
be increaesd because of the lower value for the surviving spouse's estate, but the
spouse could also sell the depressed stock after the alternate valuation date and realize
a capital loss. See I.R.C. § 165(f). For a surviving spouse with a marginal income
tax bracket in excess of 50% and net capital gains, this situation would be beneficial.
If the stock increased in value, or if the gambling bets paid off, the executor would
have to elect the date of death values in order to avoid the increase in the value of
the surviving spouse's estate and the resulting increase in the estate taxes payable on
both estates. This result could still be accomplished even if the trustee had no dis-
cretion in the choice of valuation dates as seemingly is required by Smith. See 66 T.C.
at 428.
Treasury Regulation section 20.2032-1(c) (1) states that the investment of
money is a disposition fixing the value of the funds expended so that any change in
value of the assets purchased does not affect the alternate valuation. Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2032-1(c) (1), T.D. 7238, 1973-1 C.B. 544. Arguably, this principle would not
be applicable to the surviving spouse's estate because of the assumption that the spouse
died six months after the decedent. Thus, that date would not be the assumed alter-
nate valuation date for the survivor's estate. See id. But see Treas. Reg. § 20.2032-
1(c) (3), T.D. 7238, 1973-1 C.B. 544. It seems that under the language of the Smith
opinion such assumptions could be made, provided no discretion was vested in the
trustee as to the choice of valuation dates. See 66 T.C. at 428.
65. Increasing the amount of the marital deduction above some minimum level
theoretically does not violate the terminable interest rule so long as that minimum level
is ascertainable as of the decedent's death. See REv. PRoc. 64-19, 1964-1 C.B. 682;
R. CovEy, supra note 30, at 70 & n.145f (1976 Supp.). There is, however, some ques-
tion as to whether the minimum marital deduction is ascertainable as of the decedent's
date of death for either the hypothesized or the Smith situation. See id. at 105.
66. See generally D. KAHN, E. COLSON & G. CRAVEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
ESTATES, GIFTS, AND TRUSTS 133 (lst ed. 1970). Because the sine qua non is not
violated, the hypothesized situation is not like the Revenue Procedure 64-19 type of
post mortem planning. See note 30 supra.
It should be remembered that in stating that taxability in the surviving
spouse's estate does not control the determination of whether an interest is terminable,
the Supreme Court in Jackson was referring to a contingent interest becoming in-
defeasible, and thus taxable in the survivor's estate. See text accompanying note
28 supra. The Court did not refer to an avoidance of tax altogether. In other words,
it is acceptable to tax an interest twice, but never to allow an interest to escape taxation.
67. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§ 101-2141, 90 Stat. 1520.
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provisions it is more likely that estate planners will want to utilize the
type of formula employed in Smith. The maximum allowable marital de-
duction has been increased for those adjusted gross estates valued at less
than $500,000,68 and the new uniform credit in lieu of the $60,000 exemp-
tion69 has made it less expensive to both the decedent's and the surviving
spouse's estates for the decedent's estate not to utilize the maximum
marital deduction.70 It seems clear that the interpretation of the section
will still be governed by the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Jackson.71 However, as the discussion of Smith illustrates, application
of the standard is far from simple. Until more guidance is forthcoming,
estate planners would be wise to make no attempt to expand the holding
in Smith but, rather, to treat the case as limited to its facts.
Andrew H. Dohan
68. Id. § 2002(a). Under the amendments, the maximum marital deduction is
one-half of the adjusted gross estate or $250,000, whichever is greater. Id.
69. Id. § 2001 (a).
70. In an effort to obtain the best of both; 1) less taxes, and 2) more financial
security for the surviving spouse, perhaps the best clause would be a Smith clause
coupled with a proviso that at least that sum required to give the tax liability (to the
survivor's estate) which is equal to the applicable credit shall pass to the surviving
spouse. This proviso would simply give the survivor more money without increasing
the total estate taxes on both estates. To the extent that the surviving spouse requires
more than this, the additional amount could be placed in a trust which does not meet
the requirements of the section 2056(b) (5) exception to the terminable interest rule.
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